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Abstract:
In a period when “labor-based parties” in Europe had reached their “own ‘end of history’”
with the rise of neoliberalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Keynesian
consensus, influential union organizer Tony Mazzocchi of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic
Workers Organization led a bold effort to build a workers’ party independent of the
Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States from 1991 until his death in 2002.
While the Labor Party never made its way into mainstream politics, it represented an
important moment for organizing left of the Democratic Party in the United States. This
thesis compiles the scant secondary sources and untapped wealth of primary sources
concerning the Labor Party into the first full-length history on the subject, contextualizing it
within U.S. political and Labor History. In addition, it argues that while former Labor Party
leaders are partially correct in blaming economic and political conditions for the Labor
Party’s decline in the 2000s after initial growth in the 1990s, their failure to engage
concretely with electoral politics and unorganized workers impeded the party’s success. It
also highlights the positive role played by revolutionary socialists, traditionally portrayed by
existing accounts as sectarian wreckers, in founding and building the Labor Party.
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An image of Labor Party paraphernalia, including a button produced by the Massachusetts
State Labor Party to promote the Just Healthcare campaign (top left), a copy of the Labor
Party’s Program printed by the New York Metro Chapter (bottom left), and a draft of the
curriculum developed by Tony Mazzocchi’s Labor Institute and the Oil Chemical and
Atomic Workers to promote the idea of a Labor Party (right). The former items were
provided by Jeff Booth, a former leader of the Labor Party’s Boston chapter, while the latter
was purchased second-hand from an online bookseller.
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Introduction
In a period when “labor-based parties” in Europe had reached their “own ‘end of
history’” with the rise of neoliberalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
Keynesian consensus, influential union organizer Tony Mazzocchi of the Oil, Chemical, and
Atomic Workers Organization led a bold effort to build a workers’ party independent of the
Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States.1 On June 6-9th 1996, approximately
1,500 trade unionist delegates gathered in Cleveland, Ohio to found the Labor Party, one of
several attempts made by workers, socialists, and social democrats at building an
independent party of labor in the United States.2 Despite the party making national news and
attracting the support of 80 unions, representing over one million workers in the United
States, few remember it outside of older left-wing activists and union officials.3
I first learned of the Labor Party on a crisp winter’s morning in Goddard Library
during my Freshman Year, sitting across the table from Jeff Booth—the very picture of the
classic American union member—for a discussion of “Programme of the International” by
Ted Grant. This included a conversation on the Labour Party in Britain and prompted me to
ask if anyone had tried to build such a party in the United States. It just so happened that
Booth was the former general secretary of the Labor Party’s Boston Chapter, and drawing
from his decades of union and socialist organizing, he relayed the story of Tony Mazzocchi,
the OCAWO, and the party’s demise after its founder’s death. I left that day mainly
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Sean Sweeney, “The Labor Party’s Alternative Politics,” New Labor Forum 1 (1997): 46.
Mark Dudzic and Derek Seidman. “What Happened to the Labor Party?” Jacobin, November 10, 2015.
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/10/tony-mazzochi-mark-dudzic-us-labor-party-wto-nafta-globalizationdemocrats-union.
3
McLure, Laura. “Labor Has a Party.” Dollars & Sense, September/October 1996.
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wondering how to spell Mazzocchi, but the idea of the Labor Party stuck in my mind and
we’d frequently return to the subject in our study groups—the third member missed that
particular discussion to attend a practice for his improvised comedy troop.
The present should not dictate how historians view the past, but on occasion, it
informs what questions they ask. The 2016 and 2020 elections have shaken the public’s faith
in the political establishment, and many efforts to build a new party have emerged, including
the Howie Hawkins campaign running to transform the Green Party into an eco-socialist
workers’ party, former Sanders’ campaign manager Nick Brana announcing the Movement
for a People’s Party, and several former labor party members convening to discuss launching
the Labor Campaign for an Independent Party. In light of these events, it seems fitting to
return to the perennial question of why the U.S. lacks a mass labor or socialist party.
Numerous historians and political scientists have dedicated their time to studying past
attempts at building such a party in the United States, but the most recent chapter in this
history has yet to receive academic treatment. This thesis intends to develop the first fulllength history of the Labor Party, drawing from numerous available documents, including
mainstream press coverage, the party’s public-facing documents, retrospective journal
articles, and radical newspapers, along with interviews with some of the party’s surviving
members. The central task here is to compile information from such scattered accounts and
documents into a coherent, mostly chronological, format which will provide the basis for
workers, activists, politicians, and union officials to assess this most recent attempt at
building a Labor Party in the United States, locate and engage with its documents, and apply
the lessons they take away to the efforts of the working class to engage with politics today.
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Survey of Secondary Literature and Historiography
As noted earlier, little has been written on labor history in the 1990s, let alone written
about the Labor Party founded in 1996. Looking at labor history broadly, there is only one
extended history of the American Federation of Labor-Council of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO) after the retirement of George Meany as president of the federation in 1979.
Timothy J. Minchin’s Labor Under Fire presents a 315-page history of the AFL-CIO from
1979 to 2015, focusing on the domestic actions of Lane Kirkland, John Sweeney, and
Richard Trumka. Minchin introduces his text by noting his goal to give a more “balanced”
treatment to his subject matter than previous scholarship critical of the AFL-CIO’s role in
foreign policy, and overall the text comes off as sympathetic to Kirkland and other leaders,
trying to highlight a decades-long trend of progress since Meany.4 Rather than portraying the
AFL-CIO and its members as non-partisan organizations, as many popular commentators and
even union representatives will try to do, Minchin highlights the political nature of the AFLCIO right off the bat, with the most relevant example to this project being the key role of
organized labor in electing Bill Clinton in 1992.5 Minchin’s statistical and anecdotal insight
into the role of organized labor in the 1992 presidential elections demonstrates the
importance of the union vote and the AFL-CIO’s ability to mobilize members to campaign in
U.S. politics, giving material reasons for why figures like Tony Mazzocchi saw the AFL-CIO
as an important factor in building an independent party of the working class.
While Minchin’s history provides important contextual history about internal AFLCIO politics and the federations relationships with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in the

4
5

Timothy J. Minchin, Labor Under Fire (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 6.
Minchin, Under Fire, 7, 185-6.
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1990s and early 2000s, its top-down view tends to miss the growing radicalism of organized
labor and the socialists and social democrats who gained substantial sway in the labor
movement’s grassroots in the 1990s. It mentions neither the Labor Party nor the influential
Tony Mazzocchi, although the exclusion of the latter may in part be due to his main work in
passing the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSHA) being accomplished in the 1970s.
The closest thing there is to an extended history of the Labor Party in the U.S. formed in
1996 is Les Leopold’s biography of party founder Tony Mazzocchi, The Man Who Hated
Work and Loved Labor. The majority of this text focuses on Mazzocchi’s earlier
achievements, but the final two chapters, “Party Time” and “Stepping Stones” cover an
overview of the Labor Party’s history and Mazzocchi’s vision for it. Les Leopold lays out
how Tony Mazzocchi rejected the tactics of “fusion parties” which endorsed and ran as
Democrats, “spoiler parties” which tipped the election in favor of the Republican Party, and
broad progressive coalitions such as Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition which sought to
organize activists and labor leaders while leaving the broader working class behind. Instead,
Mazzocchi intended to “build a labor party that did not initially run candidates,” on a clear
“program” that would “resonate” with workers.6 The idea being that the Labor Party should
wait and gather strength and union endorsements for a period until it had the strength to run
members in national races and win.
Leopold’s account complicates Minchin’s narrative about Kirkland’s ability to
mobilize members and hold the AFL-CIO together. Whereas Minchin depicts the 1994-95
leadership challenge within the AFL-CIO as a sudden result of NAFTA’s passage, Leopold

6

Les Leopold, The Man Who Hated Work and Loved Labor (White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green
Publishing, 2007), 439-40.
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highlights how tensions between business unionist leadership and the more militant unions
were brewing much earlier and started coming to a head as early as the 1980s with the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization strike.7 While “Mazzocchi first seriously
raised the idea of an independent party to OCAW [Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
Union] in 1972,” the idea for a labor party became more concrete for him following the
PATCO Solidarity Day, where Mazzocchi witnessed 850,000 AFL-CIO members march
only for Kirkland to tell them to go home and wait for election day, ending the possibility of
further demonstrations and in Mazzocchi’s mind letting “eleven thousand workers get fired
en masse.”8 Although Leopold’s work lacks the same academic publishing credentials as
Labor Under Fire, his account of Mazzocchi’s life provides reason to be skeptical of
Minchin’s positive view of Kirkland. Looking at both works together provides the context
necessary for historicizing the Labor Party as it emerged in the aftermath of John Sweeney’s
ascent to the AFL-CIO presidency on a wave of resurgent labor militancy in the 1990s, while
the Lean Years under Reagan and the Clinton Administration’s betrayal of organized labor
over NAFTA left a “legacy of bitterness” between organized labor and the establishment
political parties.9
One thing Labor Under Fire and The Man Who Hated Work have in common is their
top-down approach to the history of U.S. organized labor after George Meany, focusing on
the leaders of unions and U.S. presidents rather than rank and file membership in the unions.
This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, but they leave out the influence of small, but radical and
well-organized groups in the labor movement and how the membership of the AFL-CIO and
7

Minchin, Under Fire, 214.
Leopold, The Man, 434, 436.
9
Minchin, Under Fire, 203.
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Labor Party felt about and influenced events as they unfolded. Given the influence of
revolutionary socialists in several chapters of the Labor Party leaving these perspectives out
creates a somewhat incomplete history. Thankfully, socialist organizations participating in
the Labor Party often published newspapers, and primary sources can help fill in the gaps in
the secondary writings.10
Otherwise, secondary sources are sparse, save for what Sam Rosenfeld of Colgate
University describes as “historically-minded” political science works in a review of Labor
Under Fire for Labour/Le Travail, such as those by Taylor Dark and Daniel Schlozman.11 In
this vein, the book Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States by Robin Archer looks
at numerous attempts at building socialist and labor parties in the United States, comparing
them to successful attempts to build such parties in other first-world former British colonies
such as Canada and Australia to answer its titular question. While it only covers attempts
from the late 19th through the mid-20th Century, it provides a useful point of comparison for
exploring if the reasons for the lack of a successful labor party in the 19th century carried
over to the failure of Mazzocchi’s Labor Party.12 Furthermore, “The Working Class in
American History” series published by the University of Illinois Press includes a volume
titled NAFTA and Labor In North America by Norman Caulfield with relevant information to
contextualize the rise of the Labor Party alongside Minchin’s work.13 Although more
explicitly a history than Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States, Caulfield’s work
is less of a chronological history, and organizes its chapters by topic, tracing the effects of
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See the “Survey of Primary Sources” section for more discussion of socialists and internal tensions in the LP.
Sam Rosenfeld, Labour / Le Travail 81 (2018): 293-96.
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Robin Archer, Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States (PRINCETON; OXFORD: Princeton
University Press, 2007).
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Norman Caulfield, NAFTA and Labor in North America (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2010).
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NAFTA on the labor movement and collective bargaining in the United States. Furthermore,
although NAFTA and Labor in North America represents an important piece of labor history,
much of its focus rests upon the 2000s, placing a considerable amount of the text outside the
timeframe of this project. In short, while there are a few histories providing insight into the
context of the Labor Party, the 1990s in the U.S. is still relatively uncharted territory for
academic history, and this project will rely heavily on the primary sources to develop
practically the first full-length history of the party.

A Survey of Primary Sources
Articles on the U.S. Labor Party exist in peer-reviewed journals, but these tend to
either be commentaries on the party written during its existence or brief essays and
interviews looking back at the Labor Party. A few like this can be found in the New Labor
Forum published by the CUNY School of Urban and Labor Studies, and due to their nature
should be viewed more as primary sources and sometimes oral history, rather than true
secondary sources, although their academic context separates them from usual primary
sources—but perhaps not in terms of being unbiased or more or less credible. In any case,
they will be included alongside primary sources in this section.
One of the more obvious primary sources among these journal articles is Sean
Sweeney’s essay “The Labor Party’s Alternative Politics,” published shortly after the party’s
founding convention.14 Following its introduction, Sweeney’s article can be divided into
three distinctive sections: answering concerns about the racial and gender diversity of the

14

Not to be confused with John Sweeney, AFL-CIO president elected in 1995.
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Labor Party and whether it is made of the “usual suspects,” rebutting accusations in the
1990s that traditional labor parties as seen in Europe were becoming irrelevant, and
discussing the party’s relationship to the parallel reform movement in the AFL-CIO of John
Sweeney and his “New Voice” leadership.15 All three of these topics will be addressed in this
project and have been used to form questions for interviews with ex-Labor Party members to
help fill the historical gaps left by the official accounts of Mazzocchi’s close associates.
Sweeney’s article agrees with many of Mazzocchi’s ideas about offering something new to
U.S. workers through a class-based approach and notably rejects the association between
labor politics and Keynesianism which developed after World War II.16 This places the Labor
Party in contention with the trend of neoliberal politics from the 1980s, but with the broader
trends of labor politics in the U.S. supported by business unionists like Meany and Kirkland.
Sweeney’s article describes the initial challenges faced by the Labor Party and many of the
Party’s hopes at the moment, providing a somewhat academic written perspective untainted
by hindsight.
Also, it is worth noting that Sweeney was a leader in the New York Metro chapter of
the Labor Party, which had about 900 active members led a challenge to the Labor Party’s
leadership in hopes of breaking with Mazzocchi’s electoral abstentionism and running
candidates. This led to the chapter, which included several revolutionary socialists in its
ranks, being suspended by the State Executive Committee after a series of bitter debates in
2000. Sweeney is listed in articles from Justice, the newspaper of Socialist Alternative
(which had been founded in 1984 and entered into the Labor Party in 1996 as Labor

15
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Sweeney, Alternative Politics,” 43-49.
Sweeney, “Alternative Politics,” 46.
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Militant).17 Whereas Sweeney describes the Labor Party as a forum where “union leaders and
left activists are learning to work together” in 1997, over the course of three years tensions
seem to have risen extensively with Sweeney in the middle of a battle between union
bureaucrats and socialists over whether or not to run independent candidates and endorse
Nader.18
The tensions between the more radical elements of the Labor Party and its more
moderate (but by U.S. standards quite left-wing) members are often neglected in what little
recent history has been written about the party. Les Leopold’s biography of Tony Mazzocchi
touches on these debates, but Leopold’s disdain for “activists” and straw-manning of
“sectarians” undermines the credibility of the source as he constantly makes digs he takes at
progressives wanting to run candidates, and later against Ralph Nader and the Green Party,
going so far as to say Nader helped sink the Labor Party.19 Mazzocchi’s successor in Labor
Party leadership, Mark Dudzic, is more diplomatic towards the Green Party in his 2014
interview with Derek Seidman for the New Labor Forum but ignores tensions within the
party and the suspension of the New York Metro chapter, which came to a head amidst the
turmoil of the 2000 election.20 This particular interview was published alongside a reflection
by prominent political scientist and Labor Party founder Adolph Reed Jr., which commends
the publication of the Dudzic interview while adding a few additional thoughts.21 Both

17

Alan Jones, “New York Metro Chapter Suspended by State Executive Committee: How NOT to Build the
Labor Party,” Justice (2000). Based on digital transcription published at
http://markinbookreview.blogspot.com/2012/07/from-archives-of-socialist-alternative.html
18
Sweeney, “Alternative Politics,” 44.
19
Leopold, The Man, 441-2, 476-8.
20
Derek Seidman, “Looking Back at the Labor Party: An Interview with Mark Dudzic,” New Labor Forum 23
(2014): 63.
21
Adolph Reed, Jr., “Adolph Reed, Jr. Responds” New Labor Forum 23 (2014): 65.
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articles tend to agree with one another and put forward the idea that the time and conditions
were not right for a Labor Party to launch, particularly after the “momentum” and militancy
of the labor movement in the 1990s slowed down and U.S. politics took a turn to the right.22
Reed’s article diverges from Dudzic’s in putting forward a much harsher critique of
“activistism” in the U.S. left and stating that the conditions which led to the party’s collapse
were “if not inevitable, not under our control.”23 The general trend in retrospective sources
from Mazzocchi’s close associates is one of ignoring or treating with disdain the Labor
Party’s revolutionary and activist elements. They also cover up the debates with and
organizational actions taken against dissidents in the party, while blaming broader conditions
for the party’s failure rather than closely examining possible errors they made as an
organization between the founding conference in 1996 and the party’s third conference in
2002. By including sources such as old articles and new interviews from opposition within
the party, the narratives promoted by Leopold, Dudzic, and Reed, Jr. can be put to the test,
and a fuller more accurate picture of the Labor Party’s rise and fall can be painted for the first
time in the field of history.
As explored earlier, news articles for Labor Party participants such as Labor
Militant/Socialist Alternative seem to be preserved here and there, providing interesting
insights into the party’s radical wing. Meanwhile, the Labor Party’s website is still up and
includes archived documents and articles from throughout the party’s history. This includes
the full run of the Labor Party Press, which, although seemingly deleted before 2020, is
preserved in captures from the Wayback Machine service hosted by the Internet Archive.24
22

Seidman, “Looking Back,” 64.
Reed, Jr. “Responds” 66-7.
24
http://www.thelaborparty.org/index.html
23
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Alongside the Labor Party’s occasional appearances in the mainstream press, including
newspapers like the New York Times, there is a strong body of original documents archived
in various parts of the internet on which this thesis can draw.25 Additionally, two former
members of the Labor Party, Gary Olson, Chair of the Lehigh Valley Chapter, and Jeff Booth
General Secretary of the Boston Chapter, agreed to interviews on their experience in the
labor party—included in the appendices of this thesis for ease of access—and their accounts
help to paint a more detailed picture of the Labor Party’s day to day activities.
Preliminary Conclusions
The Labor Party held three conventions between 1996 and 2002, after which the party
mostly collapsed except for a brief and unsuccessful electoral effort in 2006.26 The LP and its
predecessor, Labor Party Advocates, benefited from a militant labor movement and a series
of betrayals by the Democratic Party from the 1980s to the second convention in 1998, which
fueled the growth of the effort. With favorable conditions, the LP had an easy enough time
recruiting union leaders disgruntled by Clinton’s support of NAFTA and the rise of
neoliberal ideology in both major parties in the United States from the 1970s onward.
Unfortunately for the LP, the tides of history would change by 2000, as the pressure to vote
for the Democratic Party in the presidential elections rapidly increased and labor leaders,
especially the top ranks of the American Federation of Labor-Council of Industrial
Organizations, placed the economic and political weight of the labor movement behind

25

Steven Greenhouse, “U.S. Labor Party Gets to Work at Its Second Convention,” The New York Times
(November 16th, 1998) https://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/16/us/labor-party-gets-to-work-at-its-secondconvention.html?searchResultPosition=1; Steven Greenhouse “Facing Death, Founder Fights for Labor Party’s
Life,” (Augst 25th, 2002) https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/25/us/facing-death-founder-fights-for-labor-partys-life.html?searchResultPosition=2. Just two examples of several found when combing the NY Times archives
online.
26
“Labor Party to Seek Ballot Access in South Carolina,” Labor Party News (December 2005): 1, 3.
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electing Clinton’s vice president Al Gore, along with their “2000 in 2000” campaign to elect
2000 union members to political office on the Democratic Party ballot line.27 Despite the
betrayal of organized labor by Bill Clinton over NAFTA, these campaigns show the AFLCIO moving closer to the Democratic Party after Clinton, rather than Mazzocchi’s Labor
Party. These events raise questions about how seriously endorsing unions took the Labor
Party and reveal the Labor Party largely failed in achieving Mazzocchi’s goal of “shifting the
terms of debate.”28
In addition to changing conditions and waning support from the unions, primary
documents from radical union members, who have thus far been written off, straw manned,
and ridiculed by accounts of the Labor Party penned by friends and close associates of Tony
Mazzocchi, suggest that the LP’s abstract approach to party-building and lack of
participation in electoral campaigns until after the party had disbanded also contributed to its
downfall. As part of this thesis, accounts from smaller, more radical elements of the Labor
Party have been placed into conversation with accounts from Les Leopold and other leading
members to test the strength of the predominant surviving narrative which to some degree
blames socialists for the party’s decline. While there is some truth to Leopold’s portrait of
groups of “sectarians” playing detrimental roles in certain instances within the Labor Party,
more often than not small socialist organizations built strong chapters and worked alongside
the LP’s leadership to grow the organization.29 In fact, the LP leadership’s unwillingness to
form a united front and work with the revolutionary elements of the party at critical moments
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may have undermined the party-building effort and allowed elements less committed to
independent politics to seize power and undo much of the LP’s work.
Regardless of whether the more radical sources are convincing, making a genuine
effort to include them in the history of the Labor Party and Labor Party Advocates provides a
more holistic view of the effort than what can be found in the surviving accounts. While this
may not be the definitive history of the Labor Party, pulling together disparate sources
beyond the carefully curated accounts of LP leaders will pave the way for future projects to
write that history and provide a glimpse of the labor movement to the left of John Sweeney’s
“New Voice Slate” that is not yet represented in scholarship. To this end, the story of the
Labor Party begins sometime in the 1970s, as cracks formed in the historically steady
relationship between the Democratic Party and organized labor after World War II.
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Chapter One: The Road to Labor Party Advocacy 1970-1990
In general, sources agree on the objective factors, or material conditions and social
structures, which gave rise to the Labor Party in 1996. On the one hand, the ideology of
neoliberalism began to take root in the United States as early as the 1970s, culminating in the
end of the “post-war bargaining regime” with Ronald Reagan’s administration firing striking
members of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in August 1981.
The seemingly unending attacks on U.S. workers coming from both sides of the aisle that
followed alienated workers and union leaders from the political establishment represented by
the Democratic and Republican Parties. On the other, the collapse of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the Warsaw Pact between 1989 and 1992 brought the Cold War to an
end, weakening “the ties between the institutional labor movement and U.S. imperial foreign
policy resulting in a new tolerance, and the occasional embrace, of viewpoints that would
have been beyond the pale during the Cold War years.”30 Both trends constituted major
material setbacks for the political left internationally, but for the left and working class in the
United States, they proved to have a fleeting silver lining, opening new doors for class
struggle. When it comes to subjective factors, the top leadership of the Labor Party generally
identify two main groups which drove the creation of the Labor Party: the circle of union
officials centered around Tony Mazzocchi and the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
International Union (OCAW), which advocated for the creation of a Labor Party, and the
“New Voices” Leadership of the American Federation of Labor and Council Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO) which, although never involved in the Labor Party, represented a
30

Derek Seidman and Mark Dudzic, “Looking Back at the Labor Party: Mark Dudzic Interviewed by Derek
Seidman,” New Labor Forum 23, no. 1 (2014): pp. 60-64, https://journals.sagepub.com/pbassets/cmscontent/Nlf/NLF-LookingBackAtLabourParty-1468941838437.pdf, 3.
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new and more reform-minded leadership capable of tolerating Mazzocchi’s project.31 What
members of Tony Mazzocchi’s inner circle—such as Mark Dudzic, Katherine Isaac, and Les
Leopold—tend to leave out in their retrospective discussions is the role of smaller, more
radical organizations, such as Campaign for a Labor Party and Black Workers for Justice,
which also contributed to the formation of Labor Party Advocates. Keeping in mind the
broader historical background of the 1970s and 1980s, this chapter discusses how
Mazzocchi’s reformers and more revolutionary groups converged to first form Labor Party
Advocates.
Tony Mazzocchi and “The Years of Devastation”
In August of 1992, with an end to the reign of the Republican Party in sight, the AFLCIO News coined the term “Years of Devastation” to describe the relentless attacks on
organized labor carried out under the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush.32 The AFL-CIO entered the 1980s with a new, if not particularly fresh or
young, president in Lane Kirkland and in turn faced the prospect of a new administration as
the Carter administration became increasingly unpopular. Labor Historian Timothy J.
Minchin described this period as the “start of a new era, one in which the AFL-CIO operated
in a hostile economic and political climate,” however, for all of the Democratic Party’s
verbal support for unions, the previous era was not necessarily a friendly time for unions. For
all of Democratic President Jimmy Carter’s praise of Kirkland as he took over for George
Meany, the more progressive elements of the labor movement felt alienated by the Executive

31

Ibid, 2; Mark Dudzic and Katherine Isaac, “Labor Party Time? Not Yet,” Labor Party, December 2012,
http://www.thelaborparty.org/d_lp_time.htm, 5.
32
Timothy J. Minchin, Labor Under Fire: a History of the AFL-CIO since 1979 (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 2017), 184.
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Branch and Congress long before Reagan came along.33 As early as 1972, Tony Mazzocchi
raised the issue of independent working-class politics after “a majority of Democrats
supported President Nixon’s wage controls,” and the Carter administration, with a veto-proof
Democratic Congress, failed to pass even “mild labor reform.”34 While Mazzocchi may have
been correct speaking from the viewpoint of a primarily private sector union, it appears the
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) through the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
may have brought temporary gains for organized labor, with the body initially garnering an
“anti-management record.”35 Looking at statistics on union membership in the United States
from 1973 onward, 1980 represented a turning point. While unions technically saw slight
growth from 1973-1979, from 24% of the employed population belonging to unions to a
membership rate of 24.1%, union membership declined in the U.S. from that point on,
reaching 13.5% of the employed population by 2001. Even with the slight spike in union
Membership in 1979, the Carter administrations saw an overall decrease in union density,
from 23.8% in 1977 to 23% in 1980.36 Thus, while the decline in organized labor objectively
worsened after 1980 with a decade of Republican administrations, the decline started much
earlier, including under the Carter administration. Likewise, as Mazzochi pointed out, OSHA
and the EPA, two major victories for the working class and environmentalists, were won
under the Nixon administration, an administration which, in contrast to Democratic Party

33

Ibid, 48.
Les Leopold, The Man Who Hated Work and Loved Labor (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Pub.
Co., 2007), 434.
35
Herbert R. Northrup, “The Rise and Demise of PATCO,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37, no. 2
(1984): pp. 167-184, https://doi.org/10.2307/2522839, 173.
36
Barry T Hirsch and David A McPherson, “UNION MEMBERSHIP AND COVERAGE DATABASE FROM
THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: NOTE,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56, no. 2 (January
2003): pp. 349-354, http://www.unionstats.com/Hirsch-Macpherson_ILRR_CPS-Union-Database.pdf, 352.
34

Bilsky 17

administrations in the period, gave the position of Secretary of Labor to a union member.
Mazzocchi did not attribute these gains to the Republicans, but rather pressure coming from
outside the establishment parties from what he termed “motion in the streets.”37
In some ways, the Carter administration proved to be antithetical to the interests of
unionized workers. In addition to declining union membership, not all of which can be
blamed on the Executive branch of the government, the Carter years saw the appointment of
Langhorne M. Bond to the position of Federal Aviation Administrator in 1977. In this
position, Bond made it his goal to “devise an effective anti-strike mechanism” in response to
perceived support for workers from the FRLA and the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization’s history of frequent strikes and work slowdowns.38 Whether intended by
Carter or not, Bond’s appointment was an attack on organized labor as he sought to develop
anti-strike contingency plans and ways of circumventing the FRLA through the courts,
culminating in the release of Bond’s plan through the Federal Register in 1980, an action
intended to emphasize the Administrator’s determination.39 Bond’s anti-union preparations
readied the battlefield for the opening cannonade of the Reagan administration’s attacks on
organized labor. Likewise, AFL-CIO President George Meany held bitter feelings toward
Carter for the failure of the Labor Reform Act of 1978 and the administration further
deteriorated its relationship with organized labor by deregulating the Trucking and Airline
industries.40
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Amidst Kirkland’s succession of Meany, the OCAW saw a change in leadership as
well. In 1979, two years after OCAW members elected Mazzocchi as Vice President of their
union, the union’s President Alvin F. Grospiron retired.41 Mazzochi would run to succeed
him in 1979 and again in 1981, losing both times by a narrow margin.42 While it is
unnecessary to go into great detail on Mazzocchi’s two bids for the presidency of the
OCAW, two points are relevant to the Labor Party’s development, one of which may have
even played a role in its downfall. First, Mazzocchi showed a high degree of foresight in his
1979 campaign, warning “that the 1980s were going to ‘come at us like a freight train,’ and
that the union needed to transform itself by building new alliances and griding up for a
fight,” a point his opponent Robert Goss ridiculed him on.43 Additionally, Les Leopold notes
that Mazzocchi butted heads frequently with OCAW member Bob Wages, notably not asking
him for support in the 1979 race. A rather rough associate of Mazzochi’s instead asked for
the endorsement in what Wages described as “New York Italian $#!^” something which may
have contributed to Wages support for Goss in the presidential elections. Between personal
tensions, and not sharing a similar vision of militant, anti-corporate unionism, the gulf
between Wages and Mazzocchi would widen, causing problems down the road when the
former became president and merged the OCAW with the United Paperworkers International
Union to form the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International
Union (PACE).44 While the merger, which dealt a serious financial blow to the Labor Party,
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would not occur until 1999, the roots of Mazzocchi’s vision, but also his party’s collapse can
be traced to his comments on the 1979 and 1981 elections.
Of the two contestants for president of the OCAW, events proved Mazzocchi right
by the time of the second presidential election he participated in. Just as Carter had managed
to succeed Gerald Ford on a wave of anti-Nixon sentiment, Ronald Reagan’s election
campaign benefited from a tsunami of anti-Carter sentiment after the 1979 Iranian
Revolution and the resulting Oil and Hostage crises. In addition to winning the Electoral
College with 489 votes, Reagan decisively defeated Carter in the Popular Vote by a margin
of 9.7%.45 Despite being a Republican Candidate, Reagan managed to garner a surprising
amount of support from organized labor. On October 9th, 1980 the National Maritime Union
became the first AFL-CIO affiliate to endorse Reagan for president, shortly after the
unaffiliated International Brotherhood of Teamsters did so. Members of the NMU were
quoted in the press, justifying the decision on an explicitly anti-Carter basis, with one
member telling the United Press International “Go to any of our union halls along the
coasts and you will see why we are for Ronald Reagan. It is a matter of jobs, Carter
didn't come through with anything but promises, promises, nothing but promises.”46 In
protest of Carter’s appointment of Langhorne F. Bond to head the FAA, PATCO also
threw its endorsement behind Reagan, “receiving in return a letter endorsing an efficient
control system and fairly compensated controllers, but making no mention of strike
support,” from the candidate.47 Raegan also found popularity among the building trades,
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apparently “alienated” by the civil rights movement and “attracted by the Republicans’
stronger stance on national security and moral issues.”48 With the labor movement split
over the 1980 elections, Lane Kirkland publicly stated his intent to work with the new
President, but with landslide popular support giving Raegan a sort of mandate of heaven,
the AFL-CIO leaders found themselves shut out of the White House even before the
disastrous PATCO strike took place.49
The real devastation of the Reagan-Bush years came with the presidential
response to striking air traffic controllers in 1981. Their union, the PATCO, had been
known since the late 1960s for its militancy, and under the Carter administration they
made a push to privatize the Federal Aviation Administration, along the lines of the U.S.
Postal Service, in hopes of achieving “wage determination on a private sector model”
rather than through acts of Congress.50 With what seemed like the support of President
Raegan after a period of rough relations with Carter, thirteen-thousand PATCO workers
walked out on strike on August 3rd, 1980 without prior notice to the AFL-CIO
leadership. Raegan acted without mercy against his former supporters, demanding a
return to work within forty-eight hours and firing the 11,345 workers who remained on
strike after ten days.51 This demonstrated an important lesson for unions at the time,
even with dissatisfying—and at times hostile—Democratic administrations in power,
organized labor would not find a home in the Republican Party as a means of protest.52
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The reaction of the AFL-CIO to PATCO and their effort to organize Solidarity
Day in its wake has been well covered by labor historian Timothy J. Minchin in both
Labor Under Fire and an earlier article on which the third chapter of his book was
based. The idea for a mass protest against Reagan took root as early as May of 1981, and
sprouted in early August of the same year, taking on a greater sense of urgency and
received broad support of about one-hundred non-labor groups following the crushing of
the PATCO strike.53 At least 260,000 to 500,00 demonstrators took part in Solidarity
Day on September 19th, 1980, making it one of the biggest protests in U.S. history, but
as Minchin notes, the “organizers were struggling to articulate a clear program,” due to
the variety of groups sponsoring it outside of organized labor. Additionally, Reagan’s
cuts to taxes and social services had been passed prior to the march, meaning the march
did little to mitigate the administration’s economic austerity.54 Minchin briefly
acknowledges that “some reformers were disappointed that more was not done to build
on the momentum of this remarkable day,” but fails to develop this point, leaving a
footnote citing an interview with Lane Kirkland’s eventual successor, John Sweeney of
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). Among the critical reformers, and
one whom Minchin did not cite, was Tony Mazzocchi. Les Leopold writes that labor
leaders used the event to funnel working class support into the Democratic Party for the
1982 mid-terms, recalling a slogan “The next Solidarity Day is Election Day.”
Furthermore, he quotes Mazzocchi remembering the event:
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“It was the first time in years where we [the AFL-CIO] reached out to our rankand-file. And although we characterized them as being apathetic, they
responded—850,000 working people marched to Washington. We stared Ronald
Reagan in the eye, and our trade union leadership blinked. We went in with a
bang and left with a whimper.”55
Where Mazzocchi got his Solidarity Day numbers is a mystery, as they grossly overestimate
the size of the crowd, but his quote highlights the development of his outlook on electoral
politics.56 After decades spent lobbying in Washington, Mazzocchi became tired of pulling
punches to appease members of the Democratic Party. Under the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan
administrations it became increasingly clear that a new sort of politics would be needed if
unions were going to start winning. During the 1980s, the need for political independence
grew clear to Mazzocchi, just as calls for a Labor Party were growing from more radical
sections of the labor movement.
Introducing Labor Militant
The group which would become Socialist Alternative would go by two other names
over the course of the 1980s before determining the new period going into the 21st Century
would require a new look. The origins of Socialist Alternative lie in the Committee for a
Workers’ International, an international Trotskyist tendency centered around the entryist
grouping that published the Militant newspaper and organized within the ranks of the Labour
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Party in the United Kingdom. Critics within the Labour Party argued the Militant Tendency’s
“philosophy descends directly from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, and virtually nobody
else,” and while such remarks were made with a good deal of snark, they had a certain
amount of truth to them.57 In the post-War period, when its founders argued that Trotskyism
internationally had moved away from the working class, “Militant set its sights in the first
instance on the more conscious, politically aware sections of the working class,” or the “salt
of the earth” as founding member Peter Taffe put it.58 At some point following the
foundation of the Committee for a Workers’ International (CWI) in April 1974, with fortysix members from twelve countries in attendance, a number of the tendency’s supporters
found their way to the U.S., including John Throne, a former member of the CWI’s Irish
section.59 History on the U.S. section of the CWI is generally scarce, but at some point in the
early 1980s CWI affiliated immigrants to the U.S. and local contacts coalesced into a
formation known as the Labor and Trade Union Group, with approximately three members in
Oakland, CA by 1984 along with additional members in Seattle, Chicago, New York, and
Boston. Although the name had apparently been used earlier, the group officially launched its
newspaper Labor Militant and adopted the title as its name in 1986.60 Being in political
solidarity with the Militant Tendency, which by the 1980s had elected a number of
councilors and Members of Parliament on the Labour Party ballot line in the U.K., one of the
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key demands made by members of Labor Militant was for the creation of a worker’s party in
the United States.61
By the spring of 1989, Labor Militant had published its twelfth issue, for the first
time featuring an article concretely calling for readers to support an initiative for building a
labor party in the U.S. The paper’s centerfold features the announcement of a “Campaign for
a Labor Party” (CLP) launched by CWI supporters in New York City. The themes discussed
in Mazzocchi’s work can be found in this first article, including criticisms of both the Carter
administration and the Reagan-Bush administration, importantly touching on the aftermath of
the PATCO strike in the process. The author of the article, writing under the pseudonym
Alan Jones, even goes so far as to quote an unspecified article on the need for a Labor Party
written by Les Leopold, although neither supported the CLP at the time.62 After discussing
contemporary austerity and dipping into history with a brief biography of Eugene V. Debs,
the article concludes saying that “Steps have already been taken in New York City by union
activists and youth to mobilize the labor movement in the City to put up a labor candidate in
the mayoral and city government elections later this year.” Finally, the article advertises a
conference to be held on May 13th from 11AM to 5PM with demands to “Kick out Koch”
and “For the AFL-CIO to build a Labor Party.”63
Despite the call for a conference featuring a quote from Tony Mazzocchi, the OCAW
leader and his supporters are absent from the featured speakers list for the event. Among the
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figures headlining the NYC CLP conference were Bernard Sanders, at this point an
independent “Socialist Mayor of Burlington VT,” Labour MP and Militant supporter Terry
Fields from Liverpool, and Stephen Pybus, the President of Calgary McCall Constituency in
Canada and a member of the New Democratic Party.64 Based on a retrospective article on the
Labor Party published by a former Labor Militant member, “Tony Mazzocchi was invited to
speak, but he declined, as he was only willing to speak on platforms which had a union local
or higher labor body endorse the meeting.”65 Despite the lack of support from OCAW
leadership moving in a direction favorable to a Labor Party, the meeting went ahead with
moderate success. Labor Militant’s next issue reported “close to a hundred trade unionists
and student delegates” at the event. The report highlights two CWI slogans from Terry
Fields’ contribution, calling for a Labor Party to run “workers’ candidates on a workers’
wage” and “educate, agitate, and org-anize.” Additional participants mentioned in the report
included a member of the Air Line Pilots Association International from Eastern Airlines
who had just entered the 71st day of a strike, a student from Boston, a worker from
Philadelphia, and a woman named Vinita Seward who met Eugene Debs as a kid. The report,
again written by Alan Jones, concluded with calls to “Build the CLP!” by getting union,
tenant, and student organizations involved and for rank-and-file members to call on labor
leaders to join the campaign.66
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Although in some periods of history, Trotskyists calling to form a workers’ party may
have been taken as a pie in the sky effort, in the context of the late 1980s such an idea
seemed possible. April 5th,1989 to February 20th, 1990 saw an exceptionally militant strike in
Pennsylvania against the Pittston Coal Company, involving nearly two thousand Pittston
employees and some forty-four thousand workers across Appalachia conducting wild cat
strikes, acts of civil disobedience, and even outright sabotage against the coal company.
Within the first six months of the strike, 3,700 strikers and supporters were arrested and the
United Mine Workers Association (UMWA) and Pittston Coal company broke records by
generating some 600 National Board of Labor Relations complaints against one another.67
With the strike still ongoing in November of 1989, the union “prodded” Jackie Stump into
launching an independent write in campaign for the Virginia General Assembly. Stump, who
had been held in jail for three weeks due to civil disobedience over the course of the strike,
won against incumbent Democrat Donald A. McGlothin Sr. with a landslide “two to one
ratio” of votes.68 Although Labor Militant launched the Campaign for a Labor Party in New
York when the Pittston strike was still in its early stages, the results of the strike proved their
perspective that workers could run and win on independent ballot lines, echoing and
exceeding the electoral gains made by “Labor Party” candidates in the 1870s and 1880s, who
received 31% of the vote in New York City in that period.69 The success of the Pittston Coal
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Strikers electorally, even with their strike still raging, set the tone for a second Campaign for
a Labor Party convention to be held in Oakland, California in December, 1989.
The CLP conference in Oakland represented a point of convergence between the prolabor party elements of the OCAW and the more radical pro-labor party current represented
by Labor Militant and adjacent figures. In contrast to the New York City convention, which
failed to attract the endorsement of a union local and primarily saw participation by trade
union activists, Labor Militant had sunk roots in the American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) Local 444 and managed to win the union’s
endorsement of the CLP Conference.70 Following this, the International Longshoreman and
Warehouse Union Local 6 sent a letter endorsing the conference.71 Former Labor Militant
member Richard Mellor held leadership positions in the local and actively participated in
AFSCME from 1980 to 1996. Through Local 444, Labor Militant participated in numerous
struggles in the Bay Area, participating in anti-police brutality protests surrounding the
Rodney King verdict and organizing the local labor movement to support the “Free Dewayne
Holmes” campaign in solidarity with the arrested former gang leader who organized a truce
between Bloods and Crips in the verdict’s aftermath.72 Before Labor Militant’s anti-racist
activity in the early 1990s, Mellor had been on the negotiating team for Local 444 thirty-one
day strike in 1985 by “plumbers, wastewater treatment operators and other workers” at the
East Bay Municipal Utilities District. According to AFSCME, the strike had been organized
to oppose a policy change forcing “plumbers to report to job sites with their personal vehicles
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instead of work trucks” which came as a “money saving” measure following a group of
Black employees suing the water district for discrimination and ended in a reversal of the
new policy.73 By winning the trust of unionized workers through class and anti-racist
struggle, Labor Militant supporters granted a sense of legitimacy to the CLP which would
finally attract Tony Mazzochi to their efforts.
The Oakland Meeting and the Road to Labor Party Advocates
By the late 1980s, Mazzocchi had made some headway in his effort towards a Labor
Party in his own Union. As early as 1979, Mazzocchi had begun polling workers about
support for a labor party through the Labor Institute, lacking the material support from
OCAW to conduct such a poll there. With the help of Mark Dudzic, the poll eventually
reached about 1.5% of OCAW workers, drawn from lunchrooms rather than union halls to
mitigate the bias of more active members, with 53% of participants reporting they would
support a new labor party.74 As of 1988, Mazzocchi finally found a means of obtaining the
OCAW’s financial backing, being elected to the position of Secretary Treasurer, with Bob
Wages adopting a militant program and entertaining the idea.75 Initially, the Mazzocchi
grouping focused on educational outreach; conducting polls, developing written materials
that would later form the Corporate Power and the American Dream curriculum, and
circulating a cartoon based on a recording of former New Democratic Party leader Tommy
Douglass’ Mouseland speech.76 In addition, the loose grouping centered around the OCAW
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contacted various union leaders and spoke at meetings to garner support for a labor party
project.
On December 12th, 1989, Mazzocchi came to Oakland to speak at a conference
organized by the CLP and AFSCME Local 444. Based on a recording, the meeting lasted just
over two hours, with the Local’s president, Marvin Cain, introducing the meeting, followed
by a brief contribution by Labor Militant member Richard Mellor, a thirty-minute speech by
Tony Mazzocchi, about an hour of discussion from attendees, and Mazzocchi returning to the
mic for closing remarks.77 According to one Labor Militant member’s account “Though he
[Mazzocchi] thought there would be a weak turnout, he was surprised and enthused when more
than 100 people attended the meeting, and there was complete support for the idea of a labor
party.”78 Mellor recalled Mazzocchi telling the meeting’s organizers later that the success of the
event spurred him to take the next step in his existing effort and form Labor Party Advocates, a
story corroborated by other former Labor Militant members.79
The content of the meeting is worth briefly examining, as it demonstrates early on some of
the tensions which would arise following the Labor Party’s foundation in 1996 and some of the
themes in Mazzocchi’s thinking and public speaking. Firstly, Mazzocchi explicitly identifies his
plan for building the Labor Party through “a series of public speaking engagements to identify
people in organized labor who would be interested in setting up an interim charter situation and
ultimately work toward a convention where a party would be formulated and where a program
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would begin to be developed.”80 This point came up in response to an audience question about
Mazzocchi being quoted in the Guardian discussing his strategy for building a Labor Party. A later
exchange in the discussion portion of the meeting saw member of Painters Local 4 and socialist Joe
Ryan question Mazzocci’s strategy, stating:
“I think the only way for even something that’s the beginning of a movement on a
local level to be addressed seriously and to be taken seriously by working people is to
run for office and by running for office of course you have to formulate a program,
and I was a bit disturbed, and that’s my question, is that why do you preclude from
the beginning that we will not be an electoral organization at first?”81
To which Mazzochi passionately fired back:
“My experience tells me that organizing a body is a formidable task. It’s a serious
task, and you just can’t form a party over night and run for elections. The whole
history of third party movements in this country that are built around the electoral
process is losing an election and the party collapses.”82
Ryan, likely a member of Labor Militant, represents the view expressed in articles on the
Campaign for a Labor Party, arguing for running candidates, a view which would carry on
into their intervention in the Labor Party in the 1990s.83 Mazzocchi, stands his ground in the
exchange, mirroring later arguments that his successors would make about the failure of the
Green Party.84 Despite heated moments like this, it seems the meeting epitomized
Mazzochi’s stance that a Labor Party would require open debate and the working out of a
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program through democratic means, and Mazzocchi likely enjoyed dealing with constructive,
dissenting criticisms like Ryan’s in this period.85 Mazzocchi’s opening remarks also reflected
broader themes that appear elsewhere in his work and speaking. At one point he recalls
“organizing over the garden fence” when he was growing up, a quip he used frequently to
demonstrate the ubiquity of class consciousness and union support in the community from
1934 through the 1950s.86 Mazzocchi also comments on corporate control of the media and
the need for a Labor Party to have an independent voice and press on at least two occasions.87
Going into the 1990s this point would be featured in the middle of The Labor Institute’s
Corporate Power and the American Dream curriculum, in a section titled “Corporate Control
of the Media and Politics.88
While it cannot be said for certain if the 1989 CLP meeting in Oakland was the
impetus for the formation of Labor Party Advocates, the meeting’s success likely helped in
moving Mazzocchi towards a founding conference. Around the same time as the Oakland
meeting, the CLP had grown considerably, with the Winter 1989-1990 issue of Labor
Militant reporting branches in Philadelphia, Seattle, Chicago, Columbus, and a newly formed
branch in Boston.89 Many of these CLP branches would pool their forces with local union
activists to form the basis for chapters of Labor Party Advocates. Other factors also played a
role in the founding of LPA, including favorable polling on the Labor Party Question from
members of the OCAW, and the rise of struggles for racial justice during the early 1980s.
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Black Workers for Justice and the Farm Labor Organizing Committee
Although the fight for racial justice and a diverse trade union leadership would
become defining features of the “New Voice” slate’s challenge to the Lane Kirkland
administration in the AFL-CIO in the early 1990s, a revitalized anti-racist movement within
the trade unions picked up much earlier. To his credit, Kirkland made efforts to correct
discriminatory practices in the AFL-CIO which ossified under George Meany, working
closely with leaders from the Civil Rights movement like Benjamin Hooks, Bayard Rustin,
and Coretta Scott King to plan the Solidarity Day demonstration in 1981.90 That being said,
real change in the movement came not from the top down from the bottom up, with a number
of important struggles being waged by Workers of Color in the early 1980s. In North
Carolina, the organization Black Workers for Justice (BWFJ) emerged in 1982 when a group
of Black cleaning women employed by K-Mart in the Rocky Mount area “were being
sexually harassed, discriminated against in promotions, and the hiring record was pitiful.”
They would first form the organization K-Mart Workers for Justice, which later sought to
broaden its horizons and organize Black workers across the Southern U.S.91 At the height of
its unionization efforts from the 1925 to 1945, the Council of Industrial Organizations
launched a major campaign to organize textile workers in the Southern states, known as
“Operation Dixie.” By the effort’s close in 1953, no more Southern workers found
themselves unionized than when the operation began, and the CIO’s earlier labor militancy
had died down, culminating in a final shift toward business unionism in 1956 during its
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merger with the more conservative American Federation of Labor.92 The failure of Operation
Dixie cast a long shadow over union organizing in the South, with labor historian Barbara
Griffith concluding “For American labor, Operation Dixie was, quite simply, a moment of
high tragedy from which it has yet to fully recover,” in her study of the effort.93 In this
context groups like Black Workers for Justice sought to fill a void in union organizing that
had been left since the CIO’s failure, “building a national solidarity movement around
organizing the South,” beginning in 1989.94 The organization combined “rank-and-fileunionism” with community activism to build its campaigns, entering the political arena long
before the Labor Party got started through organizing a “candidate screening process” to find
candidates supportive of their efforts and campaign for them. This effort led to the election of
candidates supporting BWFJ in the municipalities of Durham, Rocky Mount, Shiloh, and
Morrisville.95 In the process of their work BWFJ developed a unique take on building
minority unions, or unions unrecognized by the National Labor Relations Board which only
hold sway with a portion of employees in a worker place, rebranding these organizing bodies
as “non-majority unions” to avoid them being perceived as “racial minority unions.”96 The
efforts of Black Workers For Justice in the early 1980s foreshadowed the kind of militant
trade unionism which would see a revival in the 1990s and make the Labor Party and the
victory of the “New Voice” slate in the AFL-CIO possible.
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In the same decade, the Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC) launched a
campaign to unionize mostly Latino migrant farm laborers at farms contracted by Campbell’s
Soup Company. Although founded by Baldemar Velasquez in 1967, the union until the
1980s had remained fairly small, with the success of their effort at Campbell’s being a
turning point for its growth. The campaign, which aimed to pressure Campbell’s into
entering “three-way contract negotiations with growers in the Middle West” and workers
represented by FLOC began in earnest in 1968.97 According to the New York Times, FLOC’s
effort drew criticism from both the company and the union leadership of the United Food and
Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW). In 1984, Velasquez had set a goal for the
unionization effort, increasing pressure over the summer and saying, “his organization, which
reported it had 3,500 members, including 1,500 dues payers, would add 2,000 members.”98
After more than a decade of struggle, the union finally brought Campbell’s to the negotiating
table, reaching an agreement which included “provisions for wage increases, medical
insurance and paid holidays for 550 migrant workers who pick tomatoes and cucumbers.”99
According to Les Leopold, by the 1990s “with 5,000 members, FLOC became a political
force in Toledo, Ohio.”100 Like BWFJ, FLOC had combined the methods of militant
unionism which challenged union bureaucracy, social justice activism, and political action to
organize marginalized workers. Both organizations would endorse Labor Party Advocates,
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and their leaders would become delegates at the founding convention of the Labor Party in
1996.
The Founding of LPA
The late 1980s represented a turning point for Mazzocchi’s Labor Party efforts.
Union militancy and activism was again on the rise, despite the fallout of the PATCO strike
in 1981, and socialist groups like Labor Militant had begun to concretely organize
communities and union locals around the prospect of a worker’s party through the Campaign
for a Labor Party. In addition, Mazzocchi’s polling efforts had yielded results favorable to
forming a labor party, in the process revealing a split between “full-time OCAW officers and
staff” and the union’s rank-and-file membership, with union staffers showing significantly
more support for the Democrats and opposition to a Labor party.101 While union bureaucrats
may have still been content to support the Democrats, the workers they represented showed a
growing tendency toward independent political action.
The early 1990s saw the stars further align for the creation of a Labor Party, with Bob
Wages committing OCAW time, connections, and resources to a labor party effort and
granting Mazzocchi the opportunity to step down as Secretary Treasurer to organize it. By
1991, Labor Party Advocates was officially run by Mazzocchi and an interim leadership,
with endorsements from the OCAW, the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of
America, and the Pennsylvania Federation of the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees. 1992 would see 300 participants gather for an educational conference hosted in
Ohio.102 The Labor Party Advocates finally saw the first official meeting of its Interim
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Steering Committee in 1993, with “80 union leaders” representing “half a million workers”
convening in Chicago.103 Within three years, amidst shocking changes in the AFL-CIO and
the state of U.S. international trade, this grouping would host its founding convention. Over
the first half of the decade, LPA would provide a basis for Mazzocchi’s labor party effort to
educate and recruit trade union activists, enabling it to grow rapidly as the newly elected
Clinton Administration changed the playing field for organized labor and caused even the top
leaders of the AFL-CIO to question their relationship with the Democratic Party.
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Chapter Two: Dropping the “Advocates,” 1991-1996
With the formation of Labor Party Advocates (LPA) in 1991, the effort to build a
labor party was well on its way. Primary documentation on the LPA is scarce online, unlike
the Labor Party Press, which remains accessible through the Internet Archive’s Wayback
Machine. The most thorough and publicly available documentation of the Labor Party
Advocates exists in physical form in the Theresa El-Amin Papers at Duke University in
North Carolina.104 Retrospective discussions of the Labor Party tend to gloss of the Labor
Party Advocates, yet also speak of the formation with a degree of nostalgia, with Dudzic and
Isaac writing “In retrospect, it may well have been wiser to secure support more significant
support from the labor movement, retaining a looser, Labor Party Advocates structure rather
than the raised expectations of a formal party,” with Adolph Reed Jr. half entertaining this
sentiment in a later article, but also stating “It isn’t clear what would have happened if we
hadn’t called the convention when we did.”105 Despite a general lack of readily available
source material, the history of the LPA must figure into any thorough analysis of the Labor
Party. Thankfully, articles concerning the LPA from Against the Current, the journal of the
socialist organization Solidarity, cover some of the gaps in official in the five-year period
from the foundation of LPA to the foundation of the Labor Party. Furthermore, the
independent television news outlet Labor Beat filmed parts of the final days of Labor Party
Advocates, represented by the 1996 Convention, and interviewed several participants,
providing some details of the founding convention in lieu of the resolutions presented.
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As discussed previously, the Labor Party’s foundation must be contextualized in a
broader history of the U.S. labor movement, and the trajectory of the early 1990s could have
turned out very differently depending on the interaction of the AFL-CIO with electoral
politics and the Clinton Administration. Whereas the AFL-CIO under Kirkland was
staunchly pro-Democrat, cracks in the federation’s working relationship with the Clinton
administration began to form after the passing of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) in 1993, culminating in the “New Voice” slate publicly challenging and defeating
the Kirkland AFL-CIO in 1995. Alongside a renewed sense of union activism, militant strike
action, and the further weakening of anti-socialist sentiment in organized labor—the latter of
which began as early as the Kirkland years—conditions aligned for the Labor Party
Advocates to go a step further and drop the “A” in their initials. While the 1996 convention
represented a high point for debate within the Labor Party and showcased great optimism for
the coming period, it also brought tensions over how to build a party to the surface.
Unfortunately, despite the party’s commitment to open debate, its democratic process
favored international unions over smaller locals and community groups. While this may have
been more democratic in the sense of membership represented by the internationals, in
practice such unions would become the Labor Party’s weakest links. Likewise, important
tensions would come up in the process of founding the Labor Party, as the unified
commitment to economic justice and labor solidarity did not always translate to agreement
on social issues, particularly at points when the interests of socially conservative leaders
representing immigrant workers clashed with feminist elements of the Labor Party. While
spirits may have been high at the time of the party’s founding, and some questions of
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program were resolved—at least on the surface—fault lines were already developing which
would spell doom for the Labor Party once conditions changed.
The Reformation Betrayed: Clinton and the AFL-CIO from 1992-1994
Although the relationship between organized labor and the Democratic Party was
already strained as early as the Carter Administration, after more than a decade of Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush’s anti-labor policies, AFL-CIO leadership were more than
willing to support the Democrats in the 1992 elections. The intervention of the AFL-CIO on
behalf of the Clinton campaign demonstrated the political power of unions, confirming a
point often made by LPA founder Mike Dudzic that: “unions had to be at the core. As the
only institutions with the resources and the capacity to implement a broad political strategy,
no viable party can exist without the support and participation of a significant percentage of
the national labor movement.”106 Seeking a “new start” after the Bush and Reagan years, the
AFL-CIO called for its membership to vote on a resolution to endorse Bill Clinton in the
presidential election, and 99.81% of over thirteen million votes were in favor.107 With
104,426,611 votes cast in the 1992 election, if every union member who voted Clinton in the
AFL-CIO endorsement vote cast their ballot in the general election, they would account for
at least 12.5% of the popular vote.108 In discussing the elections, the AFL-CIO news even
credited the union vote with deciding “the election in eleven battleground states, including
Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio.”109 Counting just electoral votes, and not the financial
resources and manpower of the AFL-CIO, organized labor represented—and even after
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further decline likely still represents—a significant political force in the United States.
Unfortunately, while the Clinton victory may have demonstrated the power of unions in
electoral politics, his administration would disappoint after entering the White House.
The Clinton administration failed to live up to its promises for union leaders which
weakened its support from the labor movement. In addition to promises of implementing fair
trade policies in the face of the outgoing Bush administration’s version of NAFTA, the AFLCIO endorsed Clinton and Gore on the grounds that they would deliver “health care and
workplace fairness legislation.”110 Former Labor Party leaders frequently cite the North
American Free Trade Agreement as a major factor contributing to what has been described as
“the Labor Party moment.” Signed into law by Clinton on December 8th, 1993 with the
support of Vice President Al Gore, to many union members NAFTA represented “the first of
many trade agreements that implemented a globalization program that enriched a global elite
at the expense of workers everywhere,” reigniting “a growing fury” among organized
workers against the Democratic Party.111 Although NAFTA promised more jobs, better labor
standards, and fair trade, AFL-CIO leaders were critical of the Agreement’s lack of
enforcement mechanisms and recognition of the right to strike, and worried it would lead to
further deindustrialization and the outsourcing of jobs which weakened U.S. unions.112
Kirkland’s AFL-CIO managed to launch a “grassroots mobilization” of its membership
against NAFTA, even managing to sway Congress against the bill for a time, but boots on the
ground weren’t enough to defeat pro-NAFTA corporate interests outspending the federation
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by a proportion of three-to-one.113 The North American Free Trade Agreement represented
the first in a long line of “bilateral agreements with low wage countries” which unions would
lobby against, but fail to prevent, in the long run resulting in the further erosion of organized
labor’s ability to strike and the reinforcement of a trend toward concessionary bargaining.114
However, despite NAFTA weakening unions in the long run, in the short term it spawned a
period of heightened labor militancy, alongside other factors bubbling under the surface since
the 1980s and early 1990s.
Following the passage of NAFTA, the labor movement still held out hope for
healthcare reform. Months before the passage of the trade agreement, President Clinton
announced his healthcare plan on September twenty-second, 1993. Although the Clinton
Administration’s proposal did not abolish private insurance or healthcare, it attempted to
curry favor with the labor movement by “Meeting the AFL-CIO’s long-held goal of universal
coverage,” through the federal government paying for uninsured citizens. To show their
support of the bill, the AFL-CIO would launch a “grassroots public relations campaign” to
raise approval ratings for its passage.115 Just over a year later, despite “excited hopes,” the
New York Times reported “After the legislation had staggered under its own weight and the
withering attacks of Republicans and insurance interests for months, Senator George J.
Mitchell, the majority leader, bowed to the inevitable and announced that Congress would
not pursue the issue any further this year.”116 Despite the Executive branch’s support for
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healthcare reform, the Democratic Party proved to be too big of a tent to win any form of
healthcare reform, even before Republican interference came into play. As Mark E.
Rushefsky and Kant Patel noted “Some conservative Democrats were against the whole idea
and other less conservative Democrats supported a modest proposal, with few if any
mandatory features… On the left were liberals who supported a single-payer plan. No one in
either house was able to put together a bill that could produce a majority.”117 The Democratic
Party’s lack of ability to unify and pass reform further discredited it in the wake of NAFTA,
begging the question of if the big tent could not pass mild reform, was it time to build a
smaller, but ideologically more coherent alternative which could fight for the change
organized labor wanted? The failures of the Clinton administration would play into a
Republican victory in the 1994 midterm elections, described at the time as the “Reagan
Revolution Redux,” while also opening the door for workers to consider an alternative to
both the friendly austerity of the Democrats and the rabidly anti-labor policies of their
counter parts.118
Building Labor Party Advocates, 1991-1994
As discussed in the last chapter, the Labor Party Advocates became active in 1991
after OCAW president Bob Wages allowed Tony Mazzocchi to step down as secretary
treasurer and organize for the Labor Party full time, with the Interim Steering Committee not
convening until 1993, when 80 union leaders met in Chicago. Compared to what would
become the Labor Party, the LPA was a much smaller, looser formation, with a more
centralized leadership by merit of its size, but a lack of coherent program or structures. It
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tended to play an educational role, rather than an electoral or activist role in the labor
movement, with its primary function seeming to be the publication of a newsletter edited by
“veteran activist” Bob Kasen and other educational materials while organizers signed
workers up to join the movement to form a labor party.119 Although penning a
comprehensive history of the LPA is impossible without access to the formation’s documents
and newsletters, Dudzic and Isaac cover the broad strokes of its development in the essay
“Labor Party Time? Not Yet” and a contemporary speech from Mazzocchi, along with
interviews from other participants, reveal the goals and methods of the LPA in some detail.
Shortly after the founding of Labor Party Advocates in 1991, Mazzocchi’s partybuilding effort received some press in Against the Current, the bi-monthly journal of
Solidarity, a multi-tendency revolutionary socialist organization founded in 1986. The JulyAugust issue from 1992 included speeches from Tony Mazzocchi and Peace and Freedom
Party presidential candidate Ron Daniels, preceded by coverage of protests against police
brutality and racism on the West Coast.120 In a “hot room” in the summer of 1992, both men
addressed a meeting of the Community Labor Forum in Philadelphia on the subject of
independent politics.121 Mazzocchi’s contribution at the meeting detailed his approach to
building a labor party and the kind of organizing LPA was engaged in immediately after its
founding. After a humorous anecdote about the survey of OCAW members he conducted in
1989, Mazzocchi listed a series of targets to meet for adopting a formal party structure.
Whereas figures like Les Leopold and Mark Dudzic often questioned if the Labor Party’s

119

Dudzic and Isaac, “Labor Party Time?” 4.
This included the 1992 Los Angeles Riots and related protests in San Francisco.
121
Ron Daniels, “Time for a New Party,” Against the Current, 1992, no.39,
https://againstthecurrent.org/atc039/p5149/.
120

Bilsky 44

founding convention in 1996 was premature, it appears that the LPA delayed the convention
if anything, with Mazzocchi in 1992 citing 1993 or 1994 as a target date to recruit 100,000
members and form a party. Mazzocchi also highlights the loose standards for membership
and lack of LPA structures, calling himself “not the ‘leader’ of Labor Party Advocates, I’m
one of the organizers, as anyone can be,” and stating that “We don’t exist yet; we’re an
organizing drive.” In essence, anyone interested in building a labor party could join LPA if
they agreed to pay dues of $20 a year.122 The “organizing drive” metaphor, referring to the
process by which employees in a workplace make a concerted effort to talk to their
coworkers and form a union, survives in more recent retrospective works, highlighting the
role LPA played as an educational force with the goal of building “trust, unity, and tolerance
around the core issues of class and power first.”123
Elsewhere in his speech, Tony Mazzocchi brought up the diversity of membership in
Labor Party Advocates, in regard to members political activity, noting “We have LPA people
who are involved in the NOW efforts, the efforts of Ron Daniels and others. There are also
people involved in the existing political configurations, which isn’t the choice of many of
us.”124 While the former candidate and organization listed by Mazzocchi were independent
political efforts, his latter reference to “the existing political configurations” implies that a
portion, possibly a minority, of LPA members were engaged in Bill Clinton’s presidential
campaign at the time. Such members would likely have been represented by union leadership
which had endorsed the LPA, but were unwilling to back independent candidates until a
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hypothetical point when such candidates would be viable, continuing to support the
Democratic Party in the meantime. When and whether to support independent candidates
would become a central contention at the 1996 and 1998 Labor Party conventions. In the
category of LPA members involved in independent political formations would fall
individuals like Jeff Booth and his comrades in Labor Militant and the Campaign for a Labor
Party. Although a CLP chapter had been formed in the Boston area as early as 1989, it would
soon merge with the LPA.125 Booth recalls Mazzocchi putting out a call to join the LPA and
in 1991 “taking them up on that offer” by writing to or calling the national office. According
to Booth “You just joined, and you could start a Labor Party Advocates chapter, and we did
that, and there was a good response. So, we pulled a group of people beyond Labor Militant
together into an early Labor Party Advocates chapter.” The Boston Chapter of LPA
specifically had recruited nearly one hundred members on paper and was capable of regularly
turning out forty to monthly meetings.126 Les Leopold, in a rather polemical rant against leftwing “sectarians” in his biography of Mazzocchi seems to have taken notice of Labor
Militant in particular, referring to it as one of the “more sophisticated sects with ties to
current leftist tendencies in England and Ireland,” which joined the Labor Party. In trying to
chastise Labor Militant and other socialist groups interested in the Labor Party, Leopold
characterizes them as lacking numbers, specifically noting the Bay Area and New York,
where two CLP conferences were initiated by Labor Militant members, one of which
Mazzocchi even spoke at.127 In writing this, Leopold failed to consider that those he labeled
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“sectarians,” a term originally used described to describe violence and discrimination on the
between groups of differing religious identity but more recently applied to leftist “sects”
isolated from the working class and unwilling to work with other groups, is that in the
process of founding chapters such groups often attracted union locals and organized workers
to the LPA, and would go on to help form relatively successful chapters, such as those in the
Boston area.
In addition to attracting the attention of socialists from Labor Militant and Solidarity,
several other revolutionary socialist groups latched on to Labor Party Advocates. Leopold
notes the presence of various groups descended from Joseph Stalin’s synthesis of “MarxismLeninism,” including Maoists (probably including the somewhat underground organization
Freedom Road), ex-Communist Party USA members, and supporters of Albanian communist
leader Enver Hoxha.128 Likewise, the Bolshevik-Leninist current descended from Leon
Trotsky saw widespread representation beyond Labor Militant and Solidarity, through
organizations like Socialist Organizer, the Rhode Island Branch of the International Socialist
Organization, and the Bulletin In Defense of Marxism, published by a faction of the Socialist
Workers Party. The latter publication focused its March-April issue from 1996 on the debate
in Labor Party Advocates leading to the 1996 convention, even including an application to
join the LPA on its back cover.129
Labor Party Advocates would not meet its target of recruiting 100,000 members by
1994—or even after that point—but had taken on a more organized character by then.130 As
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of 1993 the LPA had established formal leadership structures, with the formation of an
interim steering committee of eighty union officials supposedly representing five hundred
thousand or so workers—although with LP membership being around fourteen thousand in
2002 and peaking at between fifteen to twenty thousand, only a small minority of rank-andfile workers were ever really involved in the formation.131 Available sources do not detail the
activities of this governing body, but it seems to have been based on endorsing unions, rather
than representing tangible LPA chapters with active membership, in contrast to Mazzocchi’s
vision of a Labor Party being “representative… by geography.”132 Likewise, without a
clearer picture of specific members on the steering committee, it is difficult to tell whether or
not this leadership body was representative in regard to gender or race, but using
participating unions as an indicator, the steering committee would come to represent at least
some marginalized identity groups, with working and unhoused women represented by the
California Nurses Association (CNA) and Kensington Welfare Rights Union (KWRU), and
immigrant workers, particularly from Latin America, represented by the Farm Labor
Organizing Committee (FLOC).133 While former LPA leaders often cite the flexibility of the
organization’s informal structures as a reason why they wish they never moved to a formal
party structure, based on the smaller nature of the steering committee, without any broader
membership structures to hold it accountable, the nostalgia for LPA may also have had
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something to do with the ability of Mazzocchi, Dudzic, Leopold, et. al. to maintain tighter
control over the formation nationally. In spite of this concentration of power and a lack of
formal structures to hold leaders accountable, the LPA’s leadership would be unable to
holdback a sudden resurgence of the Labor Left by the mid 1990s, culminating in the triumph
of a reformist opposition in a contested AFL-CIO presidential election.
“New Voices,” New Opportunities?
Despite American unions facing serious defeats in 1981 and 1993 with the firing of
striking PATCO members and the passage of NAFTA respectively, unions saw something of
a revitalization, if not in numbers than in militancy in the 1990s. As discussed previously, the
former event represented the collapse of the post-War Bargaining regime, whereas the latter
represented the culmination of two decades of neoliberal ideology taking root in both
establishment parties in the U.S. In delineating the factors which paved the way for the
“Labor Party Moment,” Dudzic and Isaac cite “A resurgence, after decades of
marginalization, of the longstanding labor/left tradition which had long focused on classstruggle unionism and independent political action.”134 This subjective change in
consciousness flowed directly from the objective economic factors—unions making
economic concessions in contract negotiations, job losses from deindustrialization, and
declining union membership rates—propagated by NAFTA and the PATCO defeat.
The Cold War also played a major ideological role in the U.S. labor movement, with
George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO since the American Federation of Labor and the
Council of Industrial Organizations merged in 1955, being a staunch anti-communist and
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pushing back on the more radical labor tendencies found in the CIO. As historian Philip Taft
wrote in 1959 “The AFL never faltered in its opposition to communism,” with the purging of
communists from union leadership being an important part of the merger.135 By and large,
Lane Kirkland continued his predecessor’s opposition to communism, becoming a strong
advocate of the anti-communist Solidarność union in Poland, but took a softer position than
Meany, actively working with anti-war groups to organize Solidarity Day and even tolerating
the presence of communists and socialists at the event.136 While the 1970s and 1980s saw an
increase in AFL-CIO union leaders distancing themselves from militant strike action and
building stronger ties with management, going so far as to endorse “well-managed
enterprise” and “developing partnerships with employers” in 1983 and 1985, this period
would also see the reintroduction of more militant former CIO unions into the Federation.137
In July 1981, immediately prior to the PATCO strike, the AFL-CIO actually had reason to
celebrate, with Kirkland negotiating a merger between the Federation and the United Auto
Workers (UAW) which brought with it 1.2 million members and 2.5 million dollars per year
in dues.138 A decade later, Ron Carey would run for president of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters on a platform of reform, promising to end endorsements for
Republican presidential candidates and say “goodbye to the Mafia, goodbye to concessionary
contracts, goodbye to those who have lined their pockets at their members' expense.”139
Shortly after, Carey would negotiate the reentry of the Teamsters into the AFL-CIO, a move
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which would “set the stage” for the John Sweeney’s ascent to the Federation presidency in
1995 and encourage an “aggressive mobilization and bargaining strategy,” according to
former Labor Party leader Mark Dudzic.140
The defeat of the AFL-CIO’s anti-NAFTA campaigns in 1993 spelled doom for Lane
Kirkland’s administration. According to labor historian Timothy J. Minchin, “The loss was
shocking and many in the labor movement felt something had to change. A defeat that even
the AFL-CIO News termed “a bitter pill” had set the stage for Kirkland’s leadership to be
challenged.”141 In 1995, John Sweeney, president of the Service International Union,
organized the “New Voice” slate to contest the presidency of the AFL-CIO in response to the
increasingly unpopular Lane Kirkland announcing his intent to run for reelection in May of
that year.142 By June, Kirkland reconsidered and retired in August of 1995, with Thomas R.
Donahue serving out the remainder of his term.143 Soon after, the “New Voice” slate was
elected and took office on October 25th, 1995, and started their administration on a militant
note by telling “the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors in July that if it pushed through a plan
to cut 18,000 workers from its payroll, his union would conduct ‘a massive campaign of
resistance and retribution.’”144 The victory of Sweeney and the “New Voice” slate
represented the culmination of an ideological shift in the AFL-CIO, with the federation
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finally recognizing its decline and the need for change.145 According to the accounts of Mark
Dudzic and Tony Mazzocchi’s partner Katherine Isaac:
“In response to growing demands for change, the ‘New Voice’ slate of John Sweeney
and Rich Trumka swept into office in 1995 in the only contested election in the
history of the AFL-CIO. They promised a revitalized labor movement with the goal
of organizing one million new members per year. A "labor spring" emerged in which
the Cold War-inspired anti-intellectualism of the labor movement gave way to new
leadership, welcoming academics and activists from other social movements to bring
their experience and energy to help revitalize the movement.”146
Other sources from the time period cite Sweeney’s presidency as an inspiration to move
towards founding a Labor Party, with an article in the New Labor Forum by Sean Sweeney, a
member of Labor Militant at the time, noting how a pledge to “stop automatic checkbook
endorsements of Democratic candidates,” was among the “New Voice” leadership’s reforms,
potentially opening a path for an independent party to emerge.147 Despite widespread praise
for John Sweeney, including from Mazzocchi and his associates in the 1995, more radical
elements of the labor movement were not quite as optimistic about the new AFL-CIO
administration. Sean Sweeney goes on to call the move by the AFL-CIO inadequate, noting
how “any plan to revitalize the labor movement while continuing Labor’s abusive
relationship with the Democratic Party is a plan set up for failure.”148 According to another
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former Labor Militant member, Jeff Booth, founder of the Harvard Union of Clerical and
Technical Workers:
“John Sweeney was a conservative. He was a breath of fresh air after Lane Kirkland,
but when I was involved in meetings in the Boston area of labor activists supporting
Sweeney coming in and the changes he would make, changes like organizing
immigrants were very positive, but Sweeney and the other AFL-CIO leaders kept
their heads in supporting the Democrats, a capitalist party.”149
Booth’s comments might not make sense relative to the standard U.S. conception of the
political spectrum and must instead be understood from a revolutionary socialist perspective,
with Sweeney being conservative in the sense of being unwilling to challenge capitalism and
willing to cooperate with the political establishment. Thus, while the “New Voice” leadership
represented new opportunities for organizing and a sense of hope for the Labor Party
Advocates that the terms of debate were changing in the U.S., the AFL-CIO would not be
backing a labor party project overnight. Instead, if the labor left was going to seize the
“Labor Party moment,” they would need to act on their own and build a challenge to the proDemocrat AFL-CIO leadership from the ground up.
The Labor Party’s Founding Convention, 1996
The question remains, why did the Labor Party Advocates drop the “Advocates” and
become a party, especially a party that would not participate in elections? It would seem the
former point was due to pressure from membership and the latter was due to pressure
specifically from union leadership. The influence from union leaders on an electoral stance
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would not officially play out until the 1996 convention and would bring an end to the Labor
Party Advocates lack of centralism when it came to its members’ participation in other
electoral projects. The 1993 Interim Steering Committee called for a founding Convention
within two years, but it would take a bit longer for the call to translate into action, suggesting
some hesitance by the LPA’s leadership.150 When it came to calling the convention, Mark
Dudzic and Katherine Isaac cited pressure from union activists to capitalize on momentum
generated by the LPA’s growth from union endorsements in 1994 and 1995.151 Adolph Reed,
jr. puts a more positive spin on this pressure, characterizing it as an “enthusiastic response”
coming from an “activist base.”152 The more revolutionary elements of the LPA were among
the supporters of moving to a more structured party model, generally being displeased with
Mazzocchi’s “abstract approach” to building LPA and what they saw as a “top down” model
of organizing, with the Mazzocchi clique firmly in control of the formal organizational
structures.153 This position was prominent among Labor Militant supporters, with Jeff Booth
similarly calling the “sign up one hundred thousand members scheme” abstract and going on
to say that, “now people who were involved in the Labor Party, they have this thing in their
head that it wasn’t really the time yet [to form a party in 1996], but Mazzocchi was pulled
away from that [position] and that’s why there was a founding convention in 1996, because
the sign up a hundred thousand people thing didn’t work.”154 While participants may disagree
today whether the 1996 convention was the correct move, at the time pressure from activists

150

Ibid, 5.
Dudzic and Isaac, “Labor Party Time?” 8.
152
Reed, “Responds,” 67.
153
Trottier, “Lessons from the Labor Party,” Socialist Revolution.
154
See Appendix I.
151

Bilsky 54

won the day. In January 1995, a meeting of the LPA National Council in St. Louis voted to
hold a founding convention in the Spring of the following year.155
Beginning on June sixth, union activists packed into an “overflowing convention hall
in Cleveland, Ohio for a “boisterous four-day event.”156 The exact number of delegates in
attendance and the number of workers they represented varies from account to account. In
the essay “Labor Party Time? Not Yet.” Dudzic and Isaac recount the presence of onethousand-and-four-hundred delegates representing nearly two million workers from nine
international unions and 117 locals, while Derek Seidman ups the number of delegates to
nearly 1,500 when introducing his interview with Mark Dudzic.157 The most precise figure
available for delegate attendance comes from a 1999 issue of the Labor Party Press (LPP),
correcting an error in the New York Times coverage of the Labor Party’s second convention
in 1998. The LPP reported that the founding convention received little press attention,
quoting Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting in characterizing the lack of press coverage at
the first convention as a “politically inspired ‘blackout’” and reporting 1,367 delegates in
1996.158 In an earlier article covering the immediate aftermath of the convention and again
criticizing the mainstream media for not covering the Labor Party, the LPP reported a total of
1365 delegates, with 428 speakers from the floor. Furthermore, the report states the party
“represented over 1,250,000 workers” and the convention cost about two-hundred thousand
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dollars to put on.159 While the mainstream media did not pick up on this first convention, an
independent news program, Labor Beat, filmed and broadcast parts of the convention,
including interviews, the debate on the convention floor over electoral policy, and a protest
that delegates participated in.
Spirits were generally high going into the founding convention, with participants
remembering it fondly. Labor Militant member and delegate Jeff Booth remembers the two
conventions he participated in as having two different kinds of energy, with the first being
characterized by an excitement because of the prospect of founding a new party.160 Gary
Olson, an at-large delegate for the National Writer’s Union from Lehigh Valley,
Pennsylvania recalled,
“I must say that, for me, nothing compared to my emotional reaction to the Founding
Convention in Cleveland in 1996. As the vote passed, marking the transition from
LPA to The Labor Party, I looked across the hall at several hundred diverse faces and
felt that I’d been waiting for this moment my entire life. Upon returning home, a few
of us set to work organizing a local chapter.”161
Green Party presidential candidate and at-large delegate Ralph Nader even expressed high
hopes for the Labor Party, remarking “This convention will be looked upon as the rebirth of
the labor movement after so many years of being subordinated to corporate power.”162 The
convention was further characterized by a unified sense of solidarity, with workers like
Margaret Trimmer-Hartley and Mike Griffin, involved in the Detroit Newspaper Strike and
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the 1993 Staley Lockout in Decatur, IL respectively, giving rousing speeches met with
roaring applause.163
The optimism of the crowd did not lower the quality of debate, which at times got
tense, and when it came to written output the convention was quite productive. As part of a
founding a formal party, the convention debated and passed a constitution and a political
program titled “A Call for Economic Justice.” The sixteen-point platform primarily consisted
of anti-corporate, pro-labor, economic demands, leading off with a call to “Amend the
Constitution to Guarantee Everyone a Job at a Living Wage,” with even demands to “End
Bigotry” and protect the environment being tied to ending workplace discrimination and
protecting jobs specifically.164 The program also reflected Mazzocchi’s belief that it was time
for workers to bargain with the state for their rights, rather than with employers, as exhibited
by the fifth demand calling for the government to “Guarantee Universal Access to Quality
Healthcare.”165 Former Labor Party leaders pride themselves upon the Party’s creation of a
program which would unify workers around class-based economic demands, rather than
appealing to self-proclaimed “activists” or “progressives.”166 As Les Leopold wrote of
Mazzocchi, “ While he personally supported left social issues, he wanted a Labor Party to be
a home not only for self-defined progressives but also for gun-toting, Bible-thumping
workers who supported a pro-worker, anti-corporate program.”167 Although debates between
revolutionary socialists, progressive activists, union leaders, and Mazzocchi’s tight-knit
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circle of supporters occurred early on in the Labor Party Advocates, they came to a head at
the 1996 convention. While some issues would be resolved, such as the debate over whether
or not to include the right to an abortion in the Labor Party’s political platform, others, such
as the party’s orientation to elections, would become defining debates for the duration of the
party’s existence.
1. The LPA and the Fight for Racial Justice
In 1997 Sean Sweeney—at the time a member of the LP’s National Committee, a
member of Labor Militant, and the Director of the Queens College Worker Education
Extension Center—reported that the Labor Party at its founding was “presently too white and
too male,” raising the importance of diversifying the Labor Party effort to reflect the racial
and gender composition of the working class.168 Although a demographic poll was never
taken on the LPA and LP’s membership, Mazzocchi and other leaders frequently stated their
intent to build a representative Labor Party in those regards. The closest any source comes to
an official figure is Mark Dudzic guessing “that about 30% were people of color and
probably about a third of the membership were women. That was probably reflected up
through the leadership of the Labor Party.”169 Referring to a report from the very first
meeting of the Labor Party Interim National Committee from August Fifteenth 1996, elected
at the convention earlier that year, leadership roughly reflected Dudzic’s estimates, with at
least four of the sixteen members in attendance being People of Color and about six being
women, with individuals beyond the elected INC being invited who would “broaden
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representation” on the committee.170 While exact figures for demographics in the Labor Party
may never be known, a close examination of the founding convention reveals a genuine,
concerted effort to begin building a truly representative party.
Interviews and recollections of the convention reveal a number of LPA members
attended with the intent of using the soon-to-be party as a vehicle for fighting for racial
justice. Some organizers, such as President of the Farm Labor Organizing Committee
Baldemar Velasquez, cited feeling left out of the mainstream political process as reason for
supporting the Labor Party. As he told Labor Beat, speaking for the primarily Latino migrant
farm workers in his union, “We need a party that sees things from this perspective, and we
don’t think this stuff is being talked about anywhere else. We feel that if we’re part of this
Labor Party… that we’ll get our issues out on the floor… and we hope that this party will be
open to hearing what American life is like from another perspective, from a different
experience.”171 The attacks on immigrant workers, and why organizers like Velasquez
wanted to seek an alternative to the Democratic and Republican Parties, can be seen through
the lens of legislation being passed at the federal and state level at the time. In 1994, voters in
California passed Proposition 187 or “Save Our State,” a ballot initiative disproportionately
targeting Latino immigrant workers which would deny public services to “illegal aliens.”172
Although some might argue the bill would only affect those workers without documentation,
Velasquez noted at the Labor Party Convention that the workers represented by FLOC often
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faced discrimination based on their ethnicity regardless of their immigration status, even if
they were American citizens.173 Although Proposition 187 was sponsored by the Republican
Party, and most Democratic Party leaders came out against it, the Field Institute reported
forty percent of Democratic voters in California voting in favor of the ballot question,
indicating substantial anti-immigrant sentiment even within the ranks of the party fighting the
law.174 It would take nearly five years for the entire law to be struck down by the courts, on
the legal grounds that legislation passed by the Federal Government later in 1996 superseded
it and states did not have the right to “regulate immigration law, a function that the U.S.
Constitution clearly assigns to the federal government.”175 The superseding federal
legislation, while not as harsh as Proposition 187, still posed a threat to immigrant workers,
strengthening immigration laws and “adding penalties for undocumented immigrants who
commit crimes while in the United States or who stay in the U.S. for statutorily defined
periods of time.”176 Months before the Labor Party convention, an article in the New York
Times characterized the immigration reform bills being debated in Congress as the “most
restrictive immigration laws in 30 years and the first cuts in the number of foreigners
entering the country legally since the 1920's,” further noting that “there are Republicans and
Democrats on both sides of the issue.”177 The uncertain future of immigration in the early to
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mid 1990s, with neither party presenting a clear opposition to criminalizing undocumented
workers, set the stage for the FLOC to endorse the Labor Party’s founding convention.
Other racial justice groups and advocates within the labor movement similarly saw
the formation of a Labor Party as a means of raising their struggles against special oppression
in front of a wider forum, in hopes of the broader working-class supporting them. Ashaki
Binta, a member of Black Workers for Justice and a Field Representative in the SEIU’s
Southern Region, expressed tentative support for the convention, telling Labor Beat that “as
African-Americans, one of our main concerns and hopes is that we can overcome through
this process some of the historical weaknesses that have existed in the effort to unify the
working class in this country. I’m hoping that we can overcome them through the building of
this labor party movement.”178 The labor movement in the United States had a complicated
relationship with the struggle for racial justice, with Timothy Minchin noting “While the
Federation had long tolerated racial discrimination within its ranks, it played an important
role in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”179 The Kirkland administration began making
efforts to diversify the AFL-CIO and work closer with the Civil Rights movement,
particularly around organizing Solidarity Day with the help of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and going into the 1990s, the effort to
diversify became a theme of the “New Voice” slate’s campaign, with John Sweeney
immediately revamping “his union's board so that 20 of its 57 members are female, black or
Hispanic.”180 Racist tendencies were present among delegates within the convention hall in
Cleveland, with Brenda Stokely, President of AFSCME District Council 1701 in New York,
178
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recalling “When I walked around that convention hall in Cleveland, I heard some folks say
things about blacks and women that would not have been out of place in Klan country. I
didn't want to be there, but I knew I had to be there.”181 While the Labor Party’s foundation
did not magically solve racism among white workers, it allowed the issues to be discussed
“under one roof” among leading members of the labor movement, with Adolph Reed, Jr.
noting the potential of the Congress “to fashion a concrete alternative both to narrow,
exclusivist forms of identity politics and to the false universalism that denies the reality of
other forms of injustice.”182 The hopes of Labor Party leadership and members would
translate into action at the founding convention, through members organizing bodies to
advance the causes of social justice and the passage of a constitution reflecting this goal.
By 1997, three caucuses were built around fighting special oppressions were
established in the Labor Party, representing “African Americans, women and Latinos.” Sean
Sweeney noted that “at least two” of the caucuses could trace their roots to “networks that
developed on the convention floor in Cleveland.”183 Although it is not completely clear
which two caucuses Sweeney meant in particular, one of them was the Black Caucus, which
held a preliminary meeting in Washington, D.C. on February 8th, 1997 with its east coast
membership, a gathering presided over by Adolph Reed and Bob Clark, the elected co-chair
of the Labor Party. In a report on the meeting for the Labor Party Press, Reed stated their
intent was to “continue a discussion in the spirit of the black caucus that met at the Party's
founding convention,” and lay the ground for a “broader meeting of black LP members later
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in the year.”184 Furthermore, the Labor Party enshrined its commitment to fighting racism in
its program and, to a lesser degree, its constitution. In the fourth point of “A Call for
Economic Justice,” the Labor Party twice cites race first and foremost as a basis upon which
“bosses have profited from dividing working people,” and a form of discrimination the party
would not tolerate. This program further called for expanding the number of identity groups
covered under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights act, opposing police brutality and “the
criminalization of dissent and poverty,” and implementing affirmative action laws.185
Notably absent are calls for any form of racially or ethnically targeted reparations, with the
intent of the program appearing to be fixing specific forms of oppression through fighting
systemic discrimination and relying on the program’s other economic demands to alleviate
generational poverty. To address the concerns about immigrant rights raised by FLOC, the
demand to End Bigotry also included a line stating, “When immigrants are scapegoated and
denied full labor rights and civil rights, we are all scapegoated and denied our rights,” with
further calls to implement immigration policy which “does not discriminate on any basis,”
and language about foreign policy which supports fair trade.186
In contrast to the Labor party’s program, its constitution is less specific when it
comes to fighting identity-based oppression, stating “We believe in a country where the
opinions of others are tolerated, bigotry and discrimination are rejected, and everyone enjoys
equal opportunity and the equal protection of the laws without prejudice.”187 The lack of
specificity here might be a point for criticism today, but available documents do not show the
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wording being a point of contention. From a socially progressive standpoint, the remainder of
the Labor Party’s demand to End Bigotry is quite far reaching, going so far as to attack
discrimination based on disability and sexual orientation, reflecting the theme of “An Injury
to One is an Injury to All.” The program’s calls for various forms of social justice even
extend into the fifth demand to “Guarantee Universal Access to Quality Health Care,” with a
line calling for “Unimpeded access to a full range of family planning and reproductive
services for men and women, including the right to continue or terminate a pregnancy.”188
However, the inclusion of this last point was never set in stone, and required some
negotiations to end up in the program, representing one of the more neatly resolved debates
to occur in the Labor Party.
2. FLOC and the Abortion Debate Within LPA
Before the 1996 Convention even began, Tony Mazzocchi had put out a call for
endorsing unions to draft, vote on, and submit resolutions with things they wanted to see in a
Labor Party Program. After forming a somewhat ad-hoc Platform Committee, Labor Party
Advocates got to work drafting a program, breaking into teams to “triage some two hundred
or so resolutions.”189 Among the unions to submit resolutions was the California Nurses
Association (CAN), which had come to support Labor Party Advocates in 1995 after
emerging “from period of internal turmoil to embrace a militant and organizing-oriented
union model.”190 The union proposed including a demand guaranteeing the right to safe
abortions, with CNA President Kit Costello citing the experience of union members dealing
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with “the results of back-alley abortions” in their hospitals.191 When the Platform Committee
accepted Costello’s suggestion, it resulted in “an unexpected rift,” in the LPA.192 The debate
over abortion at the founding convention is well covered by Les Leopold and Mark Dudzic in
their retrospective discussions of the Labor Party, as such an important issue should be. As a
central contention in the founding process, the resolution of the problem through discussion
marked a success story for Mazzocchi and company’s approach to winning over groups of
workers with socially conservative beliefs.
The debate over abortion started when Baldemar Velasquez and the numerous
“devout Catholics” in FLOC threatened to walk out over the new “plank” in the platform
which advocated the right to safe abortions. While the original wording seems to be lost in
print documents somewhere, the key point of contention became the use of the word
abortion. As the CNA and the FLOC began to clash, several LPA allegedly approached
Mazzocchi trying to get him to intervene, seeing as losing either union would be a serious
blow. In a moment of wisdom, one almost reminiscent of Jesus addressing his followers in
the Bible, Les Leopold recalls that Mazzocchi smiled and told his disciples “Let them work it
out. Isn’t that what we’re here to do?”193 Despite the hagiographical qualities of Leopold’s
work coming to the forefront in this part of the text, it appears the two unions engaged in a
fruitful debate. By the end of the convention, the unions agreed to not use the word abortion,
and instead opted for language which guaranteed the right to birth control and to “terminate
or keep a pregnancy.”194 This result came from finding some common ground, in that FLOC
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did not want to restrict abortions in cases of “rape, incest, the endangering of a mother’s
life,” in the end guaranteeing the right to choose but avoiding what Velasquez characterized
in the original language as “sloganeering.”195 According to Mark Dudzic, “The real
achievement of the abortion debate was not that it was finessed by a judicious choice of
words. Rather it was that its conclusion was crafted, agreed to and owned by workers who
had strongly held opinions on this issue and that they were willing to put them aside for the
sake of a broader unity.”196
Thus, according to the accounts of Mazzocchi’s close allies, the abortion debate
wrapped up neatly. While this may be partly true, the result was not necessarily satisfactory
and seems to have not been universally applied. Accounts published after the convention cast
doubt on the clean ending of Leopold’s story, with Sean Sweeney noting in 1997 that “The
Party leaders' anxiety about potentially divisive matters like abortion has caused quite a bit of
ferment since the program was adopted in Cleveland,” and suspecting that some activists
would continue to argue for a more explicit program when it came to issues of social
justice.197 Furthermore, a 1996 pamphlet version of the Labor Party’s A Call For Economic
Justice published by the New York Metro Chapter notably excludes the compromise
language of guaranteeing the right to terminate pregnancies, leaving the demand at the much
vaguer “Informed choice and unimpeded access to a full range of family planning and
reproductive services for men and women.”198 This would indicate some groups within the
Labor Party, particularly at a local level, took liberties in how they presented the program.
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Although entirely possible that the unions settled the debate amicably on the
convention floor, a question emerges as to why commentators like Les Leopold place the
abortion debate on such a pedestal in their work. On the one hand, the compromise
represented a victory for Mazzocchi’s proposed method of using democratic debate to settle
issues. On the other, Leopold’s placement of the abortion debate immediately before an
extended attack against “sectarians” at the founding convention is suspect.199 Leopold tells a
somewhat idealized account of unions with different views coming together to contrast his
account of his opponents at the convention, mostly including members of smaller socialist
organizations—most of whom were also active in their union locals and communities, as was
shown in the previous chapter. In contrast to the quiet “shuttle diplomacy” that occurred
between CNA and FLOC, Leopold’s idea of “the sectarians” are all represented by a single
leader from the Golden Gate Chapter who would “scream until he was red in the face.”
Whereas the Nurses and the Farm Laborers were correct to raise their differences, “the
sectarians” are portrayed villainously for the crime of challenging procedures “even when it
was obvious they would lose.”200 Although this does not cast doubt on the accuracy
Leopold’s account of the abortion debate, it reveals his bias in portraying players in the
Labor Party and raises questions about how accurately Leopold describes the extraordinarily
contentious debate on how the Labor Party should approach elections. Thankfully, the main
debate covered by Labor Beat at the convention was the debate on running candidates,
allowing viewers to see how parts of it played out.
3. The Electoral Question and Party Structure
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Finally, before moving on to the history of the Labor Party as a formal entity, it is
worth spending some time discussing the debate on how to approach electoral work which
emerged as it played out in the 1996 convention. The founding convention saw two major
camps emerge when it came to electoral strategy, with the more radical elements of the party
and a minority of union locals coalescing around a resolution drafted by the International
Longshoreman and Warehouse Union in favor of running and endorsing candidates—with
some qualifiers—and the majority of endorsing unions and the leadership of Labor Party
Advocates arguing to delay running and endorsing candidates until the party gained more
traction. Another tendency would eventually gain traction in some chapters of the Labor
Party, wishing to use fusion ballots with the Democratic Party, but this tendency would not
be a major factor in the debate for a few years to come. The voting procedures and
organization of the Founding Convention played a role in turning the tide of the vote
decisively in favor of the resolution against running candidates, in the process setting the
Labor Party on a path towards its untimely demise in the 2000s.
During the debate on electoral strategy, Luisa Gratz, representing ILWU Local 26,
stood up to read her union’s resolution. The resolution proposed delaying entering national
elections until another convention could be organized in two years to assess if the Labor
Party was in a position to do so but included two major provisions and several conditions for
Labor Party chapters, county, and state organizations to participate in elections. The
conditions were:
1. The organizations may endorse labor candidates who declared themselves
independents running at the local and state levels.
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2. The organizations may also run Labor Party candidates on the state or local level
provided they did not incur any expense to the national Labor Party.
3. Independent candidates endorsed by local Labor Party organizations and Labor Party
candidates must abide by and conform to the Labor Party’s program.
4. The Labor Party may not endorse candidates of other political parties.201
The first provision was likely included with the Jackie Stump campaign launched by the
UMW during the Pittston Coal Strike and similar campaigns in mind, with the goal of using
Labor Party chapters as a means of pushing out anti-union politicians and aiding electoral
actions initiated by striking workers.202 The latter three points reflected a strategy favored by
some elements of the Labor Party which believed that running local candidates could be a
step toward growing the organization and laying the ground for the party to run candidates
nationally. This contradicted Tony Mazzocchi’s belief that holding “isolated elective offices”
was pointless, notably saying “Look, if some progressive wants to run for local office
because he wants a job, I can understand that. But don’t tell me it’s going to fundamentally
change anything important.”203 Mark Dudzic similarly opposed running local candidates,
citing his experience with electoral campaigns being “disempowering.”204 Likewise, the
condition that campaigns would not incur costs on the national Labor Party was likely
included to circumvent “legal restrictions on the use of union funds for direct political
purposes” which Labor Party leadership feared “would have cut off access to union treasury
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funds needed to fund the party,” if they ran candidates.205 Finally, the fourth part of the
resolution ensured local chapters would be committed to working class political
independence and not attempt to use fusion ballots, a position in line with the thinking of
Labor Party leadership.206
Overall, the ILWU resolution made an honest attempt at addressing the concerns of
the majority of union leaders and Tony Mazzocchi’s associates, while allowing the Labor
Party to function as an electoral party right off the bat. In addition to the ways in which its
text addressed concerns about running candidates, the ILWU resolution received support
from a number of leading trade union activists, the sort of workers who contradicted any
attempts to slander the resolution as being the product of sectarians without organizational
support. Mike Griffin, who founded the Labor Party Advocates Chapter based in Decatur,
Illinois and played a role in challenging union bureaucracy in the militant, but unsuccessful
Staley Lockouts in 1989, spoke in favor of the resolution in an interview with Labor Beat. He
stated “I think if we’re going to have a fundamental organizing tool for the Labor Party
Advocates, we’re going to have to begin organizing out communities now, running our
people for local and state elections. We don’t need a mass budget from LPA to get that done,
we can raise the money as citizens of our local community.”207 Despite support from a
worker who received speaking time at the podium due to his role in the Staley Lockout, the
majority of union leaders in the convention room remained opposed to the resolution to run
candidates.
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A number of other union leaders expressed their opposition on the debate floor. Carl
Finamore of the International Association of Machinists (IAM) Local 1781 passionately
spoke against the ILWU motion, calling for the Labor Party to focus on “protests, pickets,
and demonstrations,” and arguing “we have come this far because we have thankfully
avoided a head on confrontation with the national leaders of the AFL-CIO in our own unions
by not challenging them on their own turf, the electoral strategy… I propose not to fight them
there until we’ve won the battle on the streets.”208 This reflected a sentiment among many
union leaders that the Labor Party was allowed to exist because of AFL-CIO President John
Sweeney’s apparent ambivalence to it. In later retrospectives, leaders of the Labor Party
would quote Sweeney’s comments on the Labor Party where he stated, “I would be the last
person, however, to discourage the dedicated brothers and sisters who are organizing the
Labor Party movement from taking their best shot and I hope the progress they are making
sends a clear signal to a Democratic Party that has moved away from working families just as
surely as it has moved away from the old, the young, the disabled, and the poor.” They would
maintain that one factor which set the Labor Party in the 1990s apart from similar attempts
was the fact that it gained enough support that “union leaders did not publicly denounce
it.”209 Implied in this line of argument was the idea that testing the AFL-CIO leadership
would spell doom for the party, likewise, suggesting a reluctance among opponents of the
ILWU motion to actively challenge John Sweeney. Delegates such as Finamore and Mary
Larsen of UE Local 111 instead supported a competing motion to delay running or endorsing
any candidates until a later date when the party had grown stronger.
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After considerable debate, the motions about electoral strategy were put to a vote. In
remembering the convention hall, Jeff Booth of Labor Militant recalled the considerable size
of the convention, with “long tables at the front for unions with the most power and the
smaller unions, activists, and community groups pushed to the back.”210 Votes at the
convention were not given out at a one delegate, one vote ratio, but rather delegates from
individual unions received colored cards indicating their relative voting power. According to
Les Leopold, many of the smaller left-wing groups at the convention opposed this, to which
leadership said that larger organizations, such as international unions, deserved more voting
power as they could bring more workers and resources to the table.211 Of course, the
weighting of delegates was based upon the potential members a union could contribute, not
active, dues paying members from that union involved in Labor Party Advocates. Footage of
the convention confirms Booths account of how votes and tables were set up, and when the
vote in favor of delaying running and endorsing candidates occurred, the front of the room
became dominated by hundreds of yellow and green cards being raised, with many blue and a
few orange cards going up toward the middle of the floor. In contrast, when those opposed
voted, far fewer placards went up, mostly toward the back of the room. The exact meaning of
each color is currently unknown, but some delegates held multiple placards and each color
likely corresponded to a share of vote.212
After the vote, many delegates applauded and praised the process. Gerald Zero from
IBT Local 705 expressed his belief that the Labor Party should wait to run candidates after
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stating that the convention included a lot of “good debate.”213 Jerry Gordon of the Workers
Unity Network expressed approval at the resounding decision to not support Democratic or
Republican Party candidates but was dismayed that the ILWU motion failed.214 Whether or
not delegates got what they wanted out of the debate on electoral strategy, most seemed
optimistic for moving from simply being advocates to being part of a real Labor Party. The
conference would then see delegates suspend the rules of debate to organize a march on the
office of Mayor White of Cleveland to protest his anti-union policies, further raising the
morale of participants.215 Despite high spirits, stresses in the Labor Party’s foundation were
beginning to form. In favoring the perspectives of delegates from larger unions, the Labor
Party threw its lot in with the ability and willingness of those unions to pay dues and
mobilize members to support it. When union militancy was on the rise this may have been
easy enough to maintain, but as conditions changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the
Labor Party would see its supporting unions fall through on their commitments.
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Chapter Three: The Growth and Decline of the Labor Party, 1997 to 2002
Members of the newly formed Labor Party got to work straight away after the
founding convention. Existing chapters of Labor Party Advocates reorganized themselves
and prepared to form state organizations with “Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, Wisconsin, California, New Hampshire, New Jersey and New York…
all moving in that direction.216 Meanwhile, at-large members set to work establishing new
chapters where none had been before while union members set to finding ways to discuss the
LP in their workplaces. In the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylvania, longtime activist and former
member of Students for a Democratic Society, Gary Olson worked to form the “Brennan
Chapter of the Labor Party,” which “at its peak” included one hundred and fifty dues paying
members with about one fifth of the membership “attending monthly meetings held at
Moravian College in Bethlehem.”217 In January of 1997, the young chapter—at that point
consisting of fifty members—voted on its name to honor the memory of local “labor leader
and historian” John Brennan who had died in December of 1996.218 Brennan had shown a
commitment to independent left politics and registered to vote as a socialist for much of his
life. In his account of the Brennan Chapter, Olson discusses their activities in some detail,
including how the LP interacted with the local labor movement, writing:
“Thanks to my friendship over the years with local members of the Steelworkers and
Teamsters, we were invited to make presentations to their local meetings. At one
point, I was welcomed to join the monthly meetings of the Lehigh Valley Labor

216

Katherine Isaac and Laura McClure, eds., “Moving to State Organizations,” The Labor Party Press, May
1997, https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104556/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv23/lp08.htm.
217
See Appendix II.
218
“Labor Party Chapter Named after Brennan,” The Morning Call, January 31, 1997, sec. B, p. 7.

Bilsky 74

Council… These combined a social function with political discussions and were
fruitful for a time. Eventually, due to pressure from the local Democratic Party
hierarchy—who were closely tied with the Labor Council and were uncomfortable
with my presence—I was gently “disinvited” from further attendance at these
gatherings. This intransigent hostility from the Democratic Party presaged one of the
most serious challenges faced by both the local and national LP.”219
Hostility from the Democratic Party was not unique to the Lehigh Valley, and especially as
the 2000 elections became serious, the Labor Party faced increasing pressure from
Democrats and their allies in organized labor to pack up shop. In addition to the pressure for
unions to support the “lesser of two evils” in the elections, union leaders would fail to deliver
on their promised support while the LP struggled to grow without running candidates.
Coupled with intense debates within local chapters and increasingly undemocratic methods
within the national party, the Labor Party would find itself in terminal decline at the turn of
the century, with its fate certain after its third convention and Tony Mazzocchi’s death in
2002.
Labor Party Campaigns, A Substitute for Candidates?
In lieu of running candidates, the LP launched a number of other campaigns to raise
awareness of specific parts of the Party’s program, occasionally petitioning for such
campaigns to become ballot questions in strategically picked districts. The Labor Party
organized four principal campaigns during its existence: Just Healthcare, Free Higher
Education, Campaign for Workers Rights, and the Campaign for the 28th Amendment. Each
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campaign corresponded to a single point in the “Call for Economic Justice,” specifically the
fifth, eighth, third and first demands, with the “28th Amendment” sought to amend the U.S.
Constitution to protect the “right to a job at a living wage or a guaranteed income when no
jobs were available.”220 Of the four campaigns, Just Healthcare resulted in the most tangible
success—likely in part due to the previous attempt at healthcare reform nationally in 1993—
and was the best recorded in Labor Party materials. For these reasons it will serve as a case
study to assess the effectiveness of the Labor Party’s campaign and recruitment strategy.
The Just Healthcare Campaign emerged as the Labor Party’s first major campaign,
for a 28th amendment began to fade. Although the first campaign seemingly got off to a
strong start, with the Labor Party Press reporting “LP activists in some 25 locations have
taken 28th Amendment petitions to their neighbors. In every location, our canvassers have
found that 70-95% of the people they talk to sign the petition,” mentions of the campaign
drop off in the LPP archives after March 1998.221 A focus on healthcare appears seven
months before this, with the September 1997 issue of the Labor Party Press including three
articles on the U.S. healthcare system. Les Leopold notes the failure of the 28th Amendment
campaigns in his biography of Mazzocchi, stating “Several party chapters really did try…
But while many people signed the petitions, there was a generalized pie-in-the-sky
dreaminess to it. Although some local activists persisted for many months, the campaign
never gained traction.”222 Mark Dudzic likewise described the 28th Amendment campaign as
“a bridge too far,” noting that “even most of the activists did not believe that an actual
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constitutional amendment was possible in any conceivable time frame.”223 Just Healthcare
seems to have been an attempt to pivot and regain lost momentum, picking a more concrete
issue to canvass around in hopes of yielding more concrete results for the Labor Party. The
first official appearance of the campaign using the slogan “Just Healthcare” coincided with
the November 1998 issue of the Labor Party Press, marking the LP’s first constitutional
convention. By this point however, Ed Bruno and the Boston Chapter of the Labor Party had
already succeeded in getting a non-binding referendum on Just Healthcare on the ballot in
one district in Massachusetts.224 With Bruno, the full-time New England organizer, playing a
leading role in the previous campaign, the Boston Chapter likely became the guinea pig for
Just Healthcare, allowing organizers test getting a non-binding referendum on the ballot and
publishing a few articles on healthcare to sound out the campaign before launching it, hoping
to avoid the effort petering out like the 28th Amendment.
Jeff Booth recalled the Just Healthcare Campaign well, with the efforts of the Labor
Party attracting illegal police repression as they collected signatures outside a supermarket in
Teal Square in Somerville. According to Booth, “We [the Boston Chapter] took the Just
Healthcare campaign very seriously…” and had turned out eight or so people to raise
awareness for the ballot question in the community. At some point, “the Somerville cops
pulled up, got out of their car and they didn’t know what was going on, these were rank-andfile cops, and they started questioning us, but we had a copy of the law permitting us to table
there and just handed it to them, so they read it and left.” Unfortunately for the tablers that
day, the manager of the store had a high-ranking friend on the force, who according to Booth,
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later “rolls up on a motorcycle with another cop car behind him, and we show him the law
but he says ‘I don’t give a **** what the law says, if you’re not out of here in five minutes
I’m going to arrest all of you.’” Booth, and Greg Gigg from the IBT, leading this group
mostly made up of young workers and college students, for most of whom this represented
their first political activity, complied to avoid getting anyone in trouble. “I was so angry that
this sort of repression happened that I went straight back to the Boston office to meet with Ed
Bruno, and he said, ‘If we do a legal thing, by the time we organize it and pay for it, the
referendum will be over.’ So, like a lot of people in this country we just ignored it and this
cop from the Somerville Police got away with illegally cracking down on petitioners trying to
organize for universal healthcare.” Booth went on to justify telling the story by saying “It’s
an anecdote, but it’s not random. It shows we were active.”225 In addition to being a fun
story, it also highlights the working relationship between Labor Militant members like Booth
and other Labor Party members like Gigg and Bruno. Contrary to Leopold’s portrayal, the
“sectarians” with British influences could get along quite well with their counterparts in
Mazzocchi’s clique and with union activists in general, talking through the best tactics for the
moment to succeed in building the Labor Party.
And the Just Healthcare Campaign did succeed to some degree, not just in the Boston
area, but in Labor Party Chapters around the country. By 1998, voters had passed nonbinding referendums for Just Healthcare by a seventy-one percent margin in West Roxbury
and Quincy, with the LP making an effort in 1999 to get Just Healthcare on the ballot in
Somerville, recruiting thirty-five new members in the process.226 Jenny Brown from the
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Labor Party chapter in Gainesville, Florida citied similar successes with the Just Healthcare
Campaign, stating “We went door-to-door with Just Health Care, even getting our county to
place a nonbinding referendum on the ballot. Like other referendums on health care and
education conducted by Labor Party chapters, it won handily.”227 In the Lehigh Valley, Gary
Olson recalled organizing a successful protest “on the need for national health with speakers
from Physicians for Social Responsibility,” attracting organizations beyond the LP to the
effort.228 Although the Just Healthcare campaign managed to make gains for the LP, both in
terms of increasing dues paying membership and raising the party’s profile in the
community, it had its limits.
Activists at the time recall running into the same issues when it came to community
outreach, regardless of the campaign going on, the fact that the LP’s electoral stance
confused people. Even Les Leopold recognizes this contention, although he claimed it only
applied to self-identified progressives, writing “It was a very tough sell. A political party that
stayed out of electoral politics?”229 In fact, beyond Leopold’s progressive paper tigers,
workers in the community were often perplexed by the Labor Party’s lack of candidates. As
Jeff Booth recalled “And of course when you’re on the street or talking to a union rank-andfiler or shop steward, they’re like ‘Oh Labor Party, how do I vote for you? Where do you run
candidates?’ They want something concrete, and you can present them with a campaign,
which we did, that’s concrete and something they can get involved with, but not everyone is
an activist. Even activists aren’t thinking long term a lot of the time. People want an
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alternative that already exists, but you can’t have that either, you have to engage people and
organize both electorally and non-electorally, to put it simply, and the Labor Party never got
that straight.”230 Even while Just Healthcare showed a higher degree of success than the
campaign for the 28th Amendment, it had its limitations, and this would cause the Labor
Party to return to the question of electoral strategy.
The 1998 Convention
The Labor Party put out a call for its first Constitutional Convention in March of
1998, scheduling it for two-and-a-half days from the Thirteenth to the Fifteenth of November
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.231 The convention would represent the high-water mark for the
Labor Party in terms of activity, press coverage, and membership with numerous mainstream
news services running stories on it. The convention saw growth in its number of delegates,
with forty-seven additional attendees bringing the total count to 1,414 delegates.232 If the LP
ever really approached twenty thousand members, it likely would have been in this period.
By March of 1998, the Labor Party was also growing in terms of union endorsements, adding
a ninth International Union to its list of endorsing organizations in addition to numerous
additional locals.233 Members didn’t know it at the time, but this would be the last new
international union endorsement for the Labor Party.234 As Jeff Booth would recall, “the
second convention was probably about as enthusiastic as the first, but this time because the
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LP was growing fast, rather than because it was new.”235 The official convention report
which appeared in The Labor Party Press in January of 1999 noted “It was a wiser and more
sober crowd, and perhaps a more determined one,” highlighting how the Labor Party had
grown and learned from the experiences of the past two years.236 The key feature of the
Constitutional Convention would be electoral strategy, with the LP Electoral Commission
founded at the 1996 Convention finally releasing a plan for electoral campaigns to be ratified
at the convention. This plan included a number of similarities to the ILWU motion from 1996
in regard to financing and holding candidates accountable, with a notable difference being
“The Labor Party will support only candidates for office who are Labor Party members
running solely as Labor Party candidates. The Labor Party will not endorse any other
candidates,” disqualifying LP chapters from endorsing independent labor candidates running
on a similar basis to the Pittston Coal Strike candidate Jackie Stump but also ensuring locals
would not go off and endorse fusion ballots or other third-party efforts. This report would
spark lively debate going into the 1998 Convention, after the Interim National Committee
adopted it on January twenty-fifth of that year.237
Although the 1998 convention did not receive recorded press coverage like the 1996
convention, the preservation of Labor Party Press issues from the period through the Internet
Archive’s Wayback Machine provide a comprehensive, if static, overview of the debate.
While Labor Party Leadership and the pro-electoral elements of the party seemed to
encourage the development of a concrete plan for elections, many in the Labor Party majority
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remained opposed to running candidates in the immediate future. The Labor Party’s co-chair,
Bob Clark, made this line of argument in an article presenting multiple delegates views,
writing:
“I think this proposal is a breath of fresh air… Our union has said all along that
someday the Labor Party has to run candidates.
If you're going to be a real political party, and you want to gather people around you
and make it real in their eyes - that's what a political party does.
But that doesn't mean that we're going to jump up and down as a union and say we
should run candidates right away… We understand that you have to build a base in
order to do that. In our union, we're focusing on getting our locals affiliated and
building this thing.”
Clark’s statement, although more positive toward elections than that of Carl Finamore to in
1996, held fast to the majority position that the Labor Party was not ready to run candidates.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Clark’s fellow Co-Chair, Kit Costello of the California
Nurses Association. Interestingly, the only African American members quoted in this
particular article both opposed running candidates in the immediate future, but this
correlation with a sample size of two should not be indicative of trends within the broader
party, Luisa Gratz, a Black woman, had been the most vocal proponent of the ILWU Local
26 resolution in 1996.238 It might however a convenient way for those opposed to running
candidates to portray the debate in the paper to subliminally shore up their case by making
their position look the most diverse in terms of supporters.
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While many labor leaders were cautious to run candidates without a base of support,
those in favor of running candidates argued that running candidates locally could be a means
through which to build the labor party. They also argued that the Electoral Committee’s
restrictions might prove to be damaging to the Labor Party’s efforts to grow. This time
around, the contributors included former City Councilor Mike Ferner of Toledo Ohio, who
wrote:
“I had zero electoral experience myself, and very little experience even working on
other people's campaigns. Going into it, people might not have thought it was
credible, but by the time we got done, it was credible. I didn't win that time, but two
years later I did win. So I think the Labor Party would not be doing itself any favors
by establishing a high threshold for what is a credible campaign, because then you're
never going to get the experience you need to get there.”
This view was also expressed by Sean Sweeney of the New York Metro Chapter, a member
of Labor Militant, which had recently went through a name change to be known as Socialist
Alternative, who stressed the need to “run to win,” while also arguing for campaigns to plan
two years in advance and outlining a plan for running candidates in New York City by
2001.239
By the time delegates made it to the convention floor, the Labor Party had reached
general agreement with the proposal of the Elections Committee, which seemed to satisfy
both Labor Party members who wanted to wait to run candidates and those who wished to
move ahead with electoral work as soon as possible. Despite the broad consensus, two
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amendments were proposed and generated considerable debate on the first day of the
convention. A section of delegates more eager to run Labor Party candidates submitted an
amendment to “allow two of the three levels of Labor Party organization (local, state, and
national) to approve electoral activity — which would remove the power of the national
Labor Party to veto an electoral campaign.”240 It is unclear from the convention report which
chapters, unions, or community organizations were behind this particular proposal. The
“sectarians” described by Les Leopold in the Golden Gate and New York Metro Chapters
appear to be likely suspects proposing the amendment, however, Leopold’s account has a
tendency to blur the lines between different tendencies with different proposals, and his
vague polemicizing makes it impossible to identify which groups were promoting more
“autonomous” local and state organizations.241 Examining the paper of Socialist
Alternative—which, like the organization, had undergone a name change from Labor
Militant to Justice in 1997—their focus was on implementing a different amendment to the
Election Committee’s proposal, with Sean Sweeney of the New York Metro Chapter
advocating for the Labor Party to eliminate a criteria for elections requiring state
organizations to have an arbitrary figure of one-thousand members before running
candidates, and instead opt for a having a recognized state chapter. In fact, other than this
proposed amendment, Sweeney’s article states “Justice supports the Electoral Committee’s
report,” revealing that Leopold’s arch-sectarians in New York City were actually quite
willing to collaborate with the national leadership in working out an electoral strategy.242
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Based on the final version of the “Report on the Labor Party’s Future Electoral Strategy,”
this amendment was accepted, and—given its omission from the Labor Party Press’
convention coverage—likely didn’t cause much debate.243 It is possible members of a
different group, Socialist Organizer, in the Bay Area were behind the controversial
amendment, although no documentary evidence has been found to confirm this. Whoever
proposed and supported allowing chapters to run candidates with the approval of two levels
of Labor Party organizations, “In the end, delegates voted overwhelmingly to defeat the
amendment.”244
The second amendment to stir trouble on the convention floor proposed changing the
Labor Party’s electoral strategy to allow chapters to run and endorse “fusion candidates” in
states like New York. The amendment, proposed by “Bill Henning of Communications
Workers of America Local [CWA] 1180” was intended to allow the New York State Labor
Party and its affiliated chapters to secure the LP’s ballot line through endorsing candidates of
the Green Party and Working Families Party.245 Labor Party leadership criticized fusion party
strategies and with good reason, noting that “fusion parties become creatures of the major
parties that they are hoping to transform. New York witnessed the disgraceful spectacle of
the Working Families Party being forced to endorse a gubernatorial candidate who - even
before the election! - promised to attack public worker unions and undermine public worker
benefits.”246 Interestingly, the generally anti-electoral leadership centered around Tony
Mazzocchi and Les Leopold found themselves in an alliance with members of the Labor
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Party eager to run candidates, including the “sectarians.” Leading up to the convention,
Socialist Alternative criticized the amendment being proposed, with Teamster El Jeer
Hawkins of Harlem vowing that “We’ll continue to fight against the fusion illusion.”247
Likewise, Vermont state representative and Progressive Party member Terry Bouricius took
to the convention floor to denounce the amendment, cautioning that “cross-endorsements
with Democrats or Republicans would be the death knell of the Labor Party.”248 Although
supporters of the CWA amendment paid lip service to independent politics by voicing
support for the Green Party, their simultaneous endorsement of the Working Families Party,
which often endorsed Democrats, clued other Labor Party delegates in to the fact that the
CWA in New York may have been less than committed to maintaining the standard of
working class political independence that the Labor Party had been founded to promote.
Although the fusion amendment was voted down, the debate over elections in the LP was far
from over, and the diametrically opposed viewpoints emerging in the New York organization
would pave the way for possibly the most contentious clash in the Labor Party’s history.
However, rather than jump to this conflict, it is worth discussing the other results of the 1998
convention.
As has been hinted at, the Labor Party’s efforts had attracted more than just the “the
same old suspects” from the “old left unions” during the course of its activity. Institutionally
the Labor Party was quite diverse, with endorsements from FLOC, the California Nurses
Association, and the Kensington Welfare Rights Union, and by the second convention the
diversity of its membership resulted was reflected in the formalization of its identity-based
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caucuses.249 While until this point many caucus meetings had been described as “informal,”
the convention reports from 1998 separate the meetings of the “black caucus, women’s
caucus, and gay and lesbian caucus,” from the “thousands of informal conversations”
occurring at the convention. Instead, these caucuses, the latter of which was a new
development since 1996, “convened” in Cleveland.250 Although Les Leopold’s account of the
Labor Party portrayed the debate over abortion as open and shut in 1996, the women’s
caucus reopened the debate in 1998, proposing the change the language on reproductive
services in the “Call for Economic Justice” from supporting “unimpeded access to a full
range of family planning and reproductive services for men and women, including the right
to continue or terminate a pregnancy,” to support “prenatal services and free, safe, legal
abortion.” This was voted down by the convention, along with an attempt to get the Labor
Party to adopt a more restrictive stance on abortion. By the end of the convention, Baldemar
Velasquez, speaking on behalf of FLOC affirmed his union’s commitment to the Labor
Party, regardless of the particular language on reproductive rights used in the program.251 It
seems that the Labor Party leadership managed to maintain the peace between the Women’s
Caucus and socially conservative layers of the Labor Party through the compromise
language, which permitted abortions in all but name, but the compromise was still not ideal.
When it came to anti-racist struggles, a resolution was proposed to oppose police brutality
and get the Labor Party to organize solidarity actions in support of Mumia Abu Jamal, a
journalist and former member of the Black Panther Party on death row, however it does not

249

Sweeney, “The Labor Party’s Alternative Politics,”44.
“Set to Organize!”
251
“Delegate Resolutions,” The Labor Party Press, January 1999,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150917170813/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv41/lpp41_main8.html.
250

Bilsky 87

seem to have been debated due to time constraints.252 At the very least, the circulation of
resolutions among delegates provided more than fourteen-hundred labor leaders and readers
of the Labor Party Press with information on the plight of Mumia Abu Jamal and what they
could do support him, whether or not the national organization debated or took a stance on
the case. At the second convention the Labor Party continued to avoid “the expediency of
identity politics” to quote Katherine Isaac and Mark Dudzic, but this came at the cost of
deadlocked debate on issues of social justice in front of the entire national organization.253
Had the Labor Party continued longer than it did whilst holding regular conventions, it is
unclear whether the abortion debate would have remained cordial.
Whether or not the Labor Party National Convention, the highest decision-making
body in the organization, would convene regularly also became a point of contention in 1998.
In organizing the Constitutional Convention, Mazzocchi had realized that holding such an
affair was costly in terms of both time and money. For this reason, the Executive Committee
of the Labor Party—the day-to-day governing body of the organization between
conventions—proposed a constitutional amendment to allow the Interim National Council to
determine when the next convention would be held with a minimum of one convention being
held every five years, rather than the National Convention setting the date. This was met with
considerable opposition, with delegates raising fears of the amendment curbing internal
democracy. In the end, Mark Dudzic broke ranks with Tony Mazzocchi and the Executive
Committee to propose a compromise where the National Convention would be convened in
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2002, about three-and-a-half years after the 1998 convention instead of two years.254 Despite
this compromise prevailing along with another constitutional reform granting a full vote to
representatives of State Labor Parties on Interim National Council, rather than only one-fifth
of a vote, some Labor Party members were still worried about issues of internal democracy
by the end of the convention. David Walters, a member of the Golden Gate Chapter and the
volunteer behind the Labor Party’s web page, praised the changes made to electoral policy at
the convention, but stated:
“I think the convention was in some ways less democratic than the last one. At the
founding convention, delegates could lobby the resolutions and constitutional
committees. This time, no one knew until the day of the convention who was on those
committees. There was less time for debate and, of course, there was the
overwhelming vote of the internationals that could, as a bloc, make the convention go
any way they wanted.”255
Despite the great hopes and productivity of debate at the second convention, and the growth
of the Labor Party which preceded it, cracks in the coalition were beginning to show. Over
the course of the two years that followed, the internal democratic structures of the Labor
Party would be put to the test locally on the question of fusion ballots, and the national party
would fail to intervene constructively.
The Battle for the New York Metro Chapter 1999-2000
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The New York State Labor Party became a hot bed for political debate following the
second convention, as the state housed two factions representing opposite tendencies within
the LP. Despite the emergence of factionalism between unions like CWA local 1180 in favor
of endorsing “progressive” Democrats using fusion ballots and activists—including members
of Socialist Alternative—in favor of running independent candidates, the New York Metro
chapter had grown considerably since the founding of the Campaign for a Labor Party in
1989. Numbers—as seems to be usual with the Labor Party—vary from account to account,
with Mark Dudzic recalling the chapter had approximately one thousand and two hundred
members at its height.256 Articles from Justice in 2000 place membership figures at “over one
thousand,” in the Spring of that year and about nine hundred in the summer, following
somewhat tense chapter leadership elections.257 Based on these accounts, a safe guess would
be that the New York Metro Chapter had about one thousand members, with more than that
around the 1998 convention and fewer as debate in the chapter ran its course. Although all
sides of the debate could have acted differently to ensure the health of the New York Metro
chapter, the local union leadership clearly violated democratic norms in the chapter’s
leadership elections, making them the antagonists of the affair. Furthermore, the failure of
Mazzocchi and the Labor Party’s leadership to act decisively and form a united front with
members of Socialist Alternative in the chapter, who they were politically closer to,
undermined the credibility of their own commitment to independent politics and maintaining
internal party democracy.
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Despite not having “significant” union support in New York State, the Labor Party
managed to grow rapidly through the efforts of its activist core. As Socialist Alternative
member Alan Jones wrote, the New York Metro chapter played a “trailblazing role in terms
of initiatives, campaigns, public events and politics in the party.”258 Members of the chapter
regularly tabled for Labor Party Campaigns, and held a number of successful public events,
even attracting celebrity attention. The Labor Party Press regularly reported the New York
Metro Chapter drawing crowds, republishing an article from the chapter’s newsletter,
MetroActive, describing a benefit with film maker Michael Moore drawing “over 350 people
and raised thousands of dollars for the chapter” on February Ninth, 1997.259 On May
Seventeenth, 1999, the New York Metro “put on a rollicking two-and-a-half-hour
hootenanny for some 470 people” to raise funds and awareness for the Just Healthcare
campaign. In addition to Michael Moore and a plethora of lesser-known artists, the famous
communist and folk singer Pete Seeger took the stage for the event.260 Possibly the largest
event organized by the New York Metro chapter was a seven-hundred-person rally to
commemorate Karen Silkwood, a labor activist martyred while working with Tony
Mazzocchi and the OCAW to expose health and safety concerns at the Cimarron Fuel

258

Jones, “Chapter Elections Fraud,” 15.
Lydia Millet, “Michael Moore Does a Benefit for NYC Chapter,” The Labor Party Press, May 1997,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104556/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv23/lp08.htm. Moore’s involvement in the
Labor Party is an interesting story. Jeff Booth and a number of other Labor Militant/Labor Party members were
tabling outside a talk being given at Boston University, where Moore lectured on the need for developing
working class culture. Booth recalled one example of how to do this according to Moore was to watch the
situational comedy Friends. Moore approached the table after the event and was interested by the idea of the
Labor Party, connecting with the New York Metro chapter shortly after. Apparently, Moore also received a
significant amount of speaking time at the 1998 convention, where he showed a declined pilot, he produced
starring Jim Belushi and Chris Elliott. Despite the Labor Party and Moore being convinced it was declined due
to its anti-corporate message, Booth said it wasn’t a very good pilot.
260
Gregory Langdon, “New York--Benefit Performance II,” The Labor Party Press, July 1999,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908104649/http://lpa.igc.org/lpv44/lpp44_orgnote.html.
259

Bilsky 91

Fabrication Site in Oklahoma.261 Thus, although unions in New York City were often
“hostile” to the Labor Party’s efforts, it managed to maintain an active organization, even in
the immediate aftermath of the 1998 convention.
The debate in the New York Metro Chapter grew directly out of the debate at the
center of the Labor Party’s Constitutional Convention, with the rival political perspectives
putting forward two different leadership slates in the November 1999 elections for the
chapter’s Executive Committee. The Communication Workers of America and other union
locals in New York City formed the “New Directions” slate to challenge the incumbent
Executive Committee majority known as the “United Action slate,” which included a number
of the chapter’s leading activists and members of Socialist Alternative like Sean Sweeney
and Gloria Mattera. The former faction represented a minority position in the Labor Party,
advocating for fusion candidacies and endorsements. They also opposed the United Action
slate’s criticism of union leaders in New York City, citing worries that protesting union
leadership and Democratic Party politicians would alienate the labor movement in general to
the LP’s detriment. United Action fired back that their goal was not to win over union
leadership, noting that union leaders in New York were “firmly embedded” in the
Democratic Party establishment and had even endorsed Republican Mayor Rudy Giuliani in
the most recent election. The United Action slate instead wanted to focus on organizing ranand-file union members and communities to challenge both union leaders and the two parties
of big business in the city.262 The far left of the Labor Party, represented by United Action in
this context, probably had the most in common with the LP’s national leadership in practical
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terms, in that both groups were strong opponents of fusion politics at the 1998 convention,
and agreed with the word of the Labor Party’s Electoral Policy, even if they differed in levels
of enthusiasm for running candidates. On the other hand, while Tony Mazzocchi himself was
more or less sympathetic to socialists, likely due to his “experiences with Reds and radicals
in the ‘40s,” his “advisers” were biased against them, “fearing” they would tear the Labor
Party apart.263 The “sectarians” in the New York Metro chapter had thus far been productive
members of the Labor Party, but from the beginning Labor Party leaders held the belief “that
unions had to be at the core,” of the effort to build a party, which led them to treat building
community organizing and activism as secondary priorities to bringing union leadership on
board with the LP.264 Without strong institutional support from unions, the odds were stacked
against the United Action slate from the start if the Labor Party leadership had to intervene.
The election period got off to a reasonable start, with supporters of both slates going
to membership with leaflets and campaign materials promoting their visions of the New York
Metro Chapter’s future, whether it lay in running candidates or fusion voting. After weeks of
campaigning and debates, “Suspicions of fraud were aroused when the night before ballots
were to be sent out, (November 12) membership coupons for scores of new members were
handed to the Chapter’s Election committee. A large portion of these—77—were the recruits
of one individual candidate of New Directions, who had no record of recruiting anyone
before becoming a candidate.” The United Action slate took immediate action, sending out
members to visit the new recruits and deliver election leaflets, only to find that the members
“included children as young as one year old, 7 years old, ten years old, instances of an
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address where 8 of the new recruits ostensibly lived there but there was only one person
actually living there, and people who had no clue about being members of the Labor Party
other than they knew or were related to the New Directions candidate.”265 The accounts of
the New Directions slate are not -available, unfortunately leaving their perspective on how
the elections went out of the picture, but the case for a fraudulent election was quite strong.
According to Les Leopold, chaos quickly descended upon the chapter as “charges and
countercharges” dominated every meeting. Leopold repeats the story about one group
“signing up toddlers to pad its numbers,” but his account otherwise lacks specifics, ignoring
the political issues in the debate (earlier iterations of which are well documented in the Labor
Party Press’ convention coverage) and taking a plague upon both of your houses approach to
the matter. As is usual in Leopold’s book, Mazzocchi is the reasonable man in the middle,
trying to make peace.266 Leopold entered his anecdote with a preconceived bias that both
groups must be wrong, because both were “fringe ideological sects,” and anyone deemed a
sect by Leopold was bad.267 Where his argument ultimately breaks down is the point that one
of the two groups was not a “fringe ideological sect,” the New Directions slate clearly had
the backing of union leadership in the chapter with close ties to the Working Families Party,
and by association with that party’s strategy, were supportive of Democrats.268 He states the
debate drove away “unionists and other non-sectarian workers,” yet the key antagonist in the
affair was a section of labor union leadership, coming from CWA Local 1180.269 In fact, the
driving out of members Leopold cites is contradicted by the fact that at the time of its
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suspension, the New York Metro Chapter still claimed nine-hundred members, meaning a net
loss of about one-hundred since the electoral fraud became a debate in the chapter.270 If “nonsectarian” workers were a majority, and they likely were, why did the debate only drive away
about 10% of membership? Despite clear grounds for an investigation of fraud, the chair of
the chapter Election Committee, himself a union leader, only accepted eight challenges of the
seventy seven ballots mailed under suspicious circumstances—mailed the same day and from
the same location in addition to including children, a corpse, and individuals unaware of their
membership—resulting in an election where “New Directions candidates elected all 17 of
their slate by an average differential of about 60 votes.”271 Despite significant evidence,
Mazzocchi refused to intervene in the affair decisively.
One possible interpretation of events, and this is subject to change if more evidence
were to emerge, is that Mazzocchi, Leopold, and company were more afraid of setting a
precedent for disciplining union leaders they wanted in their party than they were for setting
a precedent for punishing breaches of democratic norms. The Executive Committee had
already shown a tendency for favoring union leadership over community organizations in
how they ran conventions.272 Despite the New Directions slate having opposite politics to the
rest of the Labor Party with their endorsement of fusion voting and their likely breach of
democratic norms, coming out strongly against the few unions to support the Labor Party in
New York City while supporting the socialist faction would possibly alienate other union
leaders, and according to Mazzocchi’s approach to organizing, the endorsements of union
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leaders would bring members to the Labor Party. Denouncing both sides of the debate would
also allow the Interim National Council to consolidate its power in the Labor Party, as Les
Leopold notes the solution to the crisis was to suspend the whole chapter and switch to a
system of “chartered organizing committees.273 Leopold had already showed authoritarian
tendencies in his view of how the Labor Party should be run by proposing “shutting out” the
sectarians he despised, adding some credibility to the notion the Labor Party leadership
would want to centralize power at the cost of internal democracy if they felt a threat to their
control.274
The New York Metro Chapter’s suspension in May of 2000 would precipitate serious
changes in the approach of Socialist Alternative. According to Jeff Booth, until the chapter’s
suspension Sean Sweeney and the New York membership had led a faction in Socialist
Alternative’s National Committee in favor of liquidating into the Labor Party. Booth and
Philip Locker, a student member from Oberlin College, had argued against this faction on the
grounds that most of Socialist Alternative’s new recruits at the turn of the century were
coming from the international anti-Globalization movement, college campuses, and
intervening in the Ralph Nader campaign. The suspension of the New York Metro chapter
shifted the terms of debate--to borrow a term from Mazzocchi—in the organization. Without
a Labor Party to intervene in, Sweeney, who had built his entire perspective in Labor Militant
and Socialist Alternative around the LP, would soon part ways and focus on his academic
career.275 Gloria Materra, who held a position on the NYM LP chapter’s Executive
Committee would leave Socialist Alternative but remain an ardent supporter of independent
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left politics, taking on a leadership role in the Green Party in New York and helping convince
the Green Party to adopt the Labor Party’s economic platform.276 Those that stayed in
Socialist Alternative would reorient to Booth and Locker’s perspectives, and the “Battle of
Seattle” against globalization would mark a turning point for the organization, paving the
way for its intervention in Occupy Wall Street and the eventual election of city councilor
Kshama Sawant.277
The Labor Party’s Slow Demise 2000-2002
Despite the suspension of the largest chapter in the Labor Party, Les Leopold was
somewhat unconcerned about the effect it had on the party’s viability. The loss of the New
York Metro chapter was temporarily offset by “union recruiting” which had “accelerated a
bit.”278 Even with a surge in membership, the Labor Party’s days were numbered. The
pressures of the 2000 election would undo much of the anti-Democratic Party sentiment
which had fomented in the Labor Party after Clinton passed NAFTA. The resulting decline in
union militancy would evaporate the Labor Party’s base of support, while a stealthily
encroaching recession for working people and sudden nationalistic shift in U.S. politics in
2001 would unilaterally wipe out left politics and movements in the United States. The Labor
Party limped into its third and final convention in 2002, its fate sealed by the changing
political climate and the loss of support from the labor movement and community activists.
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Although endorsements from union locals and labor leaders brought the Labor Party
new sources of income, they did not necessarily translate to increases in active membership.
In Boston Jeff Booth remembered “severe gatekeeping” when it came to trying to meet with
the membership of union locals, even when it came to “ostensibly pro-Labor Party union
officials.” While Booth noted that some unions, like the UE made efforts to build the Labor
Party, for most their endorsements were just on paper. Even officials in Mazzocchi’s own
union could be difficult, “I remember there was an OCAW local in Waltham, and we met
with one person from that local where we said, ‘we want to meet with your members.’ We
would put forward different formulas for both official and unofficial meetings, but 99% of
the time, including at that OCAW local, the officials would either say “no, we can’t do that”
or they would just string us along until it never happened.”279 Although Mazzocchi made a
concerted effort to keep the Labor Party effort real in OCAW, even the support of his own
union would dry up over time.
As noted in the first chapter, Bob Wages, president of the OCAW, always had an
uneasy relationship with Tony Mazzocchi, but he supported the Labor Party after the success
of Mazzocchi’s polls of union members in 1989. Unfortunately, the pressures placed on the
labor movement by the tides of history would eventually catch up with OCAW. Despite a
revival of union militancy and the rise of the “New Voice” AFL-CIO leadership in 1995,
union density continued its steady decline, dropping from 14.9% when John Sweeney took
power to 13.5% by 2001.280 In general, “globalization and deindustrialization had ravaged
the membership of sponsoring unions,” reducing the Labor Party’s remaining base for
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recruitment and finances.281 The “Tech Bubble” of the 1990s helped to offset the economic
impacts of deindustrialization, keeping the markets afloat as “National employment in
technology sector industries shot up by 36 percent over the period,” and “Average weekly
wages for technology sector workers doubled, rising by 102 percent over the 10-year
period.”282 Unfortunately for American workers, this did not translate to economic
prosperity, as in addition to the loss of industrial employers in the U.S., what jobs remained
“had been downgraded significantly through the increasing prevalence of part-time
employment, wage cuts, and work speedup.”283As the labor movement withered in the late
1990s, Bob Wages began to question the viability of the OCAW, stating “We were losing
members and not organizing in sufficient numbers to give me hope that we could reverse our
fortunes through organizing.” In January of 1999, Wages finalized a merger between his
union and the more conservative United Paperworkers International Union to form the Paper,
Allied, Chemical, and Energy International Union (PACE).284 By 2001, the conservative
currents within PACE had won out and leadership of the union ended subsidies for the Labor
Party, which had been key to paying the LP’s full time staff.285 In the past the Labor Party
had built a base of dues paying union locals and membership capable of raising thousands of
dollars at events, but events out of Mazzocchi’s hands were rapidly eroding this financial
base. To add to the Labor Party’s growing money problems, U.S. politics were undergoing
changes as well.
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Although John Sweeney had initially taken an ambivalent stance on the Labor Party,
and even went so far as to question the relationship between the Democratic Party and the
AFL-CIO in some writings, the 2000 election would mark an end for union leaders tolerating
independent political projects. Facing the prospect of another Bush presidency in the 2000
election, the AFL-CIO rallied its support around AL Gore’s campaign. In addition, John
Sweeney proved an unwillingness to break from the Democratic Party, instead opting to
change the party from within through the “2000 in 2000” campaign which aimed to elect two
thousand union members into office on Democratic Party Ballot lines in the election. This
strategy saw considerable success for the Democrats and the AFL-CIO in terms of winning
races, as the effort exceed its goal by six hundred seats.286 The pressure to support the
Democratic Party in the 2000 election was great even within the Labor Party. Although Tony
Mazzocchi personally liked Ralph Nader, who spoke at the Labor Party conventions in 1996
and 1998 and at times donated office space and funds to the effort, by the end of 2000, any
association with Nader was political suicide in the Labor movement. Mazzocchi spoke at the
Green Party convention that nominated Nader, which was a bridge too far for the labor
leaders and discredited the effort in the eyes of many unions which pulled their
endorsements.287 As Dudzic and Isaac put it, “The debacle of the stolen 2000 Presidential
election - and the subsequent scapegoating of Green Party candidate Ralph Nader as a spoiler
- created an environment hostile to any attempt to build an independent political
movement.”288 This hostility would only increase in the year that followed.
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Although the 2000 election brought organized labor back firmly within the confines
of the Democratic Party, the terrorist attacks which took place on September 11th, 2001
would put what little remained of progressivism in general, let alone the independent and
socialist left, in the country on hold until the Iraq War. In response to the high jacking of
planes into the Pentagon and the Twin Towers, a sudden wave of nationalism swept the U.S.
Jeff Booth recalled how every street in Boston was plastered with American Flags, to the
point that any house not waving flags and holding candlelight vigils on its porch became a
curiosity to stare at. When the attack occurred, Booth had been tabling with Phillip Locker
outside of Breuger’s Bagels in Boston, upon seeing the event occur on a television screen
inside and pausing to fully grasp what was happening, they realized “we won’t be able to do
anything after this.” According to Booth “Nothing was going on for the Left after that until
the anti-Iraq War movement, if the 2000 election had knocked the Labor Party down, 9/11
buried it.”289 While Bush entered office with a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many
Americans, his response to the September Eleventh Attacks resulted in a sudden conservative
shift in U.S. politics, with Bush’s popularity soaring in the aftermath.290
Mazzocchi’s Labor Party managed to push on to the promised 2002 convention, but
not in great shape. The Labor Party stopped publishing The Labor Party Press online by
November of 2000, leaving few traces from the Labor Party until 2004 with the launch of the
Labor Party News. The 2002 convention was held in late July, sometime around the twentyseventh, in Washington, D.C. and included a demonstration.291 An article from Socialist
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Alternative commented that “Going into the LP's 2nd national convention in 1998, the party's
newspaper was full of interviews and debates between LP activists about how to build the
party effectively. This time, there are so few activists left that The LP Press did not run a
single article about convention debates - just the invitation to the conference.”292 Even former
Labor Party leadership acknowledges the LP’s last convention reflected the “diminished
prospects” of the new period, taking a “step back” from the electoral strategy approved in
1998 to refocus on “issue-oriented organizing campagins.”293 Unlike the 1998 Convention,
the 2002 did not receive press coverage, but a story on Mazzocchi appeared in the New York
Times in August, painting a similarly drear picture of the Labor Party in that year. As the
Labor Party struggled to survive, so did Mazzocchi, battling Pancreatic Cancer with only “a
few weeks or a few months to live.” According to Greenhouse’s report, the Labor Party had
stagnated at 14,000 members, relying on the support of 350 remaining union locals to keep it
afloat.294 Tony Mazzocchi would die a few months later on October fifth, 2002. Committed
to building the Labor Party to the bitter end, even in his final months he remained optimistic
that it would outlive him, when asked about the LP’s slow growth he told the press “Looking
at the experience of the Social Democratic parties in Europe, they didn't grow overnight.”295
Mazzocchi’s death did not bring about the end of the Labor Party. In the literal sense,
the party outlived its founder, with elements of the LP making a few last efforts to organize
through 2010. In another, the LP’s fate had been sealed much earlier, with tactical
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blunders—not running candidates and failing to prioritize organizing non-union workers—
and changing conditions compounding to ensure its decline. The task remains to assess the
party’s lasting influence on labor politics, and its relevance to socialist, left, and broadly
working-class politics today.
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Conclusion: Wither the Labor Party?
The Labor Party would outlive Mazzocchi by about five years, finally suspending its
operations in 2007.296 In this period, it would attempt to rebrand its internet presence and
even make its only foray into electoral politics, but such moves did not translate to any
lasting growth. Having explored the main body of the Labor Party’s history, the task of
assessing its legacy, and what workers, socialists, and labor leaders can learn from the Labor
Party experience remains. The central question of this assessment must be, what—if
anything—could have been done differently to have made the Labor Party effort a success?
For the purposes of this discussion, “success” should be defined in terms of the New
Democratic Party in Canada, an oft cited inspiration for Mazzochi’s Labor Party. Mark
Dudzic explains this point best, recounting:
“The NDP was interesting. First of all, because a lot of unions had direct experience
with it, so it was accessible and was comfortable to the union culture. And you had
the model of the passage of single-payer healthcare that was led by the NDP even
though they didn’t actually hold power in any province except Saskatchewan. They
were a minority power nationally, but they were able to, as Tony always used to say,
seize the terms of debate and move a working-class agenda with a national political
basis. That was really important. And then you had these exciting new movements in
the context of neoliberalism.”297
This anecdote establishes a much lower bar for success than the outright replacement of one
of the two dominant parties in American politics, while also setting a higher standard than
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simply winning various isolated offices. Thus, for the Labor Party to have been successful, it
would have either needed to achieve substantive elected power in a particular administrative
region, such as a state, or through its creation won a significant social democratic reform. In
the latter case, the passage of any of the Labor Party’s campaigns, including Just Healthcare,
the 28th Amendment Campaign, and Free Higher Education, could be considered such
reforms. Although the Labor Party failed to meet these criteria, only resembling the NDP’s
success in its institutional support from unions (albeit on a smaller scale), it is worth
pondering how the Labor Party could have survived long enough to play a similar political
role to the NDP, but in U.S. politics.
First, the ability of conditions outside of the Labor Party’s control which affected its
growth must not be underestimated. As discussed earlier, a set of clear-cut political and
economic factors precipitated the rise and fall of the Labor Party. The emergence of
neoliberalism in the 1970s and the collapse of the post-war bargaining regime after the
PATCO strike in the early 1980s created a gap between the organized working class in the
United States and both the Democratic and Republican Parties. Although unions had high
hopes for Bill Clinton in the 1990s, the passage of NAFTA under his watch, and in turn Lane
Kirkland’s inability to defeat the trade agreement, opened the door for a revival of social
unionism in the United States to challenge both the Democratic Party and AFL-CIO
establishments. The Labor Party, along with the very much distinct New Voice leadership led
by John Sweeney, represent two political reactions to those circumstances, with the Labor
Party representing a reaction from the left of the new AFL-CIO leadership. The failure of the
labor movement to reverse the trend of declining union membership in the face of
deindustrialization caused by NAFTA eventually eroded the institutions which funded the
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Labor Party and made its existence possible, at least under Mazzocchi and company’s
framework of centering the party around unions. Finally, the fallout of the 2000 elections and
the September 11th terrorist attacks acted as an ideological damper on independent politics
and labor militancy. In the face of such circumstances, the Labor Party had little chance of
maintaining its momentum in the early 2000s, but different courses of action may have
allowed the LP to weather the storm and reemerge with new vigor by 2008, acting as a pole
of attraction for the Occupy Wall Street movement which emerged then.
In a comparative study of the rise of the Australian Labor Party and the near
establishment of a Labor Party in the United States by the American Federation of Labor in
the 1890s, Robin Archer discussed several factors which may have made the difference
between a Labor Party forming in the former country, but not the latter. Among the factors
most relevant to this project were questions of Race and Immigration, which will be
broadened to include issues of Social Justice as well, the organization of unions in each
country, and the role of socialists in the labor party efforts.298 In the context of Archer’s
work, the focus of the chapters on Race and Immigration was the effect of racial and ethnic
hostility on the development of a labor party. Archer deemed hostility based on race and
immigration “Negative” factors, meaning that neither one had a significant impact on the
development of a labor party in the 1890s, given that Australia and the U.S. experienced
similar levels of both in industrial working-class communities (particularly hatred toward
Chinese and Eastern and Southern European immigrants), and a labor party still developed in
Australia. Of the two factors, hostility toward immigrants became a decisive factor in the
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1900s, but not in the 1890s.299 Mazzocchi’s Labor Party, unlike much earlier attempts at
forming a Labor Party, developed explicitly anti-racist perspectives, and, in contrast to the
AFL’s position of non-discrimination in affiliate union bylaws but allowing unions to
discriminate on the basis of race in practice, went so far as to develop Black leadership—
including LP co-chair Robert Clark, Theresa El Amin, and Adolph Reed, Jr.—and internal
caucuses to discuss and promote issues faced by People of Color within the organization.300
In fact, after Mazzocchi’s death, one of the last holdouts of the Labor Party was in South
Carolina, where the party obtained sixteen-thousand signatures from working-class, often
majority Black, communities to obtain state ballot access.301 In Boston, Jeff Booth recalled
the Labor Party becoming a forum for coordinating ant-racist organizing in the Labor
Movement, with Theresa El Amin recruiting Alan Booth—no relation—and Jeff to organize
with Black Workers For Justice.302
This is not to say that the Labor Party always excelled in the category of organizing
for social justice. Although it had a base of immigrant Latino workers through FLOC and a
number of leading Black labor activists in its ranks, some of the Labor Party’s stances today
might be seen as not going far enough, such as on the question of abortion. Although
Mazzocchi’s closest associates attempted to portray the debate over abortion as a cleanly tied
up debate through an organic compromise in language, the debate at the second LP
convention and a copy of the program distributed as a pamphlet in New York City contradict
this. Had the Labor Party persisted for longer, with more conventions, the failure to settle the
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debate over abortion and possibly other social questions could have snowballed over time.
Likewise, anti-racism should have featured more prominently in The Labor Party Press.
Among the “Positive” factors, or factors which played a decisive role in the
establishment of labor parties, Archer lists the impact of what was known in the 1890s as
“new unionism,” a tendency which organized “unskilled and semi-skilled workers into large
‘open’” industrial or general unions. The new unions, as opposed to the more conservative,
closed craft unions, “had the motivation and the resources to engage in independent political
activity.”303 The rise of new unionism in the 1890s could be seen as a political parallel to the
revived labor militancy and social unionism which took hold in the AFL-CIO from the late
1980s through the 1990s, which emphasized challenging the establishment, diversifying
unions and their leadership, and organizing immigrant, public sector, and service industry
workers along with traditional factory and trade workers. According to Archer, the weakness
of the new unionism in the United States played a decisive role in preventing the growth of a
labor party in the 1890s, in particular, the reluctance of Samuel Gompers to embrace the
tendency of such unions toward independent political action thwarted the effort.304 Likewise,
John Sweeney’s favorable orientation to the Democratic Party and at best ambivalent stance
on the Labor Party in the 1990s did not help the Labor Party’s growth, but if Sweeney and
other labor leaders had intervened decisively in support of the LP it could have totally
changed the course of the effort. Furthermore, as has been discussed, even among the unions
and locals that endorsed the Labor Party, organizers often found it impossible to talk to rankand-file membership about the party. The “severe gatekeeping” of the union locals would
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hurt the LP’s recruitment efforts in the long term and further undermine the party’s aim to
promote social unionism.305 Had union leaders supporting the Labor Party made a greater
effort to mobilize rank-and-file members of their locals, the party could have built a stronger
base and overcome its stagnation at about 14,000 members.
In the context of the 1890s, Archer also cites the impact of socialist sectarianism as a
factor in the Labor Party’s failure, noting that union leaders feared that if they established a
Labor Party it would “lead to a destructive outbreak of factional conflicts between activists.”
Importantly, Archer blames both reformists and revolutionaries for these conflicts.306 While
this played a role in the Labor Party, particularly in the conflict between the pro-fusion and
pro-independent candidate factions of the New York Metro chapter, revolutionary socialists
overwhelmingly played a positive role in building the LP and genuinely intended to build a
Labor Party and not just carve away whatever recruits they could. Had Mazzocchi and the
Executive Committee intervened decisively against the anti-democratic measures taken by
the “New Directions” slate in 1999, a slate which stood for fusion balloting in opposition to
overwhelming majority of the LP, rather than taking a plague upon both your houses
approach, they likely could have built an amicable relationship with the so-called
“sectarians” of the New York Metro Chapter.
Unfortunately, in the midst of prioritizing unions that often failed to deliver even a
fraction of the active membership they claimed to represent, the Labor Party leadership
sidelined community organizers and rank-and-file union activists. In a period of declining
union membership, any attempt to build a workers’ party of any sort would first and foremost
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need to flow from an active drive to organize workers not affiliated with unions. The
example of the New York Metro Chapter showed that a sizeable organization could be built
out of unorganized workers and rank-and-file activists, with or without the approval of local
labor leaders. While some labor leaders promised to challenge the AFL-CIO leadership in the
streets at the 1996 convention, in practice this did not play out in a significant manner
coming from the Labor Party. Les Leopold rejected an organizing model based on Jesse
Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition as the wrong way to start, due to it being too oriented to
existing progressives and activists.307 However, an activist coalition model could have been
the solution to the Labor Party’s growth problems. As Gary Olson, a veteran organizer of the
New Left and Students for a Democratic Society in the 1960s and 70s, argued:
“For me, creating a mass movement must take precedence over a new party or at least
they must occur simultaneously. I’m encouraged by the interest now in evidence
about the first Rainbow Coalition in Chicago in the late 1960s. The Black Panthers,
Young Lords (Puerto Rican) and the Young Patriots (poor white migrants from
Appalachia) were able to put aside their differences in favor of their interests as a
class. Alas, owing to COINTELPRO this was not to be but there’s no objective
reason it can’t be attempted again on a larger scale. It was this type of vision that
animated my original attraction to the Labor Party.”308
Olson draws an important parallel between the Labor Party’s mission and Fred Hampton’s
Rainbow Coalition, in that both groups aimed to organize on a class basis as a means of
fighting oppression, both economic and social. Modeling a coalition approach after the
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original Rainbow Coalition, organized by the working class from the bottom up, rather than
Jackson’s top-down Democratic Party campaign could have been a means of engaging
community members in the Labor Party and provided a basis for launching challenges to
bureaucratic leadership in the AFL-CIO and organizing new workplaces to further grow the
Labor Party’s institutional support from unions.
Finally, the question of electoral politics played an important role in determining the
success of the 1996 Labor Party. Although Mark Dudzic often drew parallels between the
Labor Party and the New Democratic Party in Canada, he notably ignored that the NDP had
from the start been an electoral effort in his analysis. This fact comes up in a roundabout
fashion when Dudzic and Isaac note the prominence of an animated adaptation of NDP
founder Tommy Douglas’ Mouseland speech in the 1980s, where Douglas describes the
“story of a mouse that faces the false dilemma of voting for either a black cat or a white cat,
parties that clearly do not represent the interests of the mouse.”309 Getting into a comparative
history of the LP and the NDP is a task for another day, but it will suffice to say that the
Labor Party opposed electoral politics, while taking inspiration from a movement started by a
politician, not a union organizer like Mazzocchi. The Labor Party made an electoral effort in
the last year or so of its existence by petitioning for ballot access in South Carolina, but gave
up saying “Even this inspiring effort, however, fell victim to the growing marginalization of
the labor movement and the rising tide of Obamamania.”310 By 2006 when the ballot access
effort began, even many of chapters of the Labor Party which didn’t suffer from alleged
sectarian conflicts, such as the Brenan chapter in Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania, had packed
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up shop.311 While conditions may have been against the Labor Party running a campaign in
2007 when they ceased operations, the Labor Party could have made earlier efforts to enter
electoral politics, while it still had the support of unions and an active, national membership.
As Jeff Booth argued:
“People don’t wait forever. Short-termisim, in terms of political thinking is a fact of
life. When you’re organizing you have a window of opportunity, you have a mood,
and if you don’t go through that window or hit the mood right people move on to
something else. In this country that means the “progressive” Democrats that come on
the scene promising the world. If you’re going to form a workers’ party in this
country, it’s not like you’ll have forever to do it. The issue-based campaigns and sign
up a million people things didn’t work. To attract people to the project of building a
Labor Party you have to actually do it. You can debate whether that means simply
running local candidates, running in wider races, or a combination.”312
While it can’t be said for certain if running candidates would have saved the Labor Party, at
least in terms of letting it survive to play a role in the next uptick of struggle, by the time the
LP stopped dragging their feet and moved into the electoral arena, their window of
opportunity had long been shut. With overwhelming support for a strategy of running
candidates emerging from the 1998 convention, the Labor Party should have at least put the
methods it outlined to the test, and such methods could have been the key to saving the LP.
When it came to shifting the terms of debate in the U.S. as Mazzocchi wanted, the
Labor Party failed, with nothing to show for it. However, the Labor Party experience itself is
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worth studying, in hopes of informing future discussions of whether the working class needs
a party of its own and how such a party could be built. This thesis provides a comprehensive
history of the effort, for the first time bringing previously obscure and disconnected primary
documents together with the official accounts of the Labor Party published by leading figures
like Les Leopold, Mark Dudzic, and Katherine Isaac. There is however more work to be
done. The 1990s are still a relative frontier for labor history, and while Minchin provides a
thorough history of the AFL-CIO, historians have yet to test his account or write a similarly
extensive history of the rank-and-file labor movement in the period, an account comparable
to something like Art Pries’ Labor’s Giant Step. Furthermore, as this conclusion attests to,
modernizing Archers comparative history of the U.S. and Australian labor party efforts could
be taken into the twentieth century, with the writing of a comparative history of the LP and
the NDP, or maybe even a comparative history of the Green Party U.S., the Labor Party, and
the Reform Party. Possibilities abound for pulling working class history closer to the present
day.
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Appendix I: A Revolutionary Socialist’s Recollections of the Labor Party
The following is a transcript representing the first half of an interview conducted with Jeff
Booth on January 24th, 2021. This first half of the interview is quoted extensively in the main
body of the thesis. It is followed by notes from two follow up interviews. The first portion
represents a direct transcript, although the spellings of certain proper nouns and use of
punctuation may be mistaken.
Would you like to introduce yourself?
My name is Jeff Booth, I live in Eastern Massachusetts. I spent a long time in Boston,
Sommerville and Cambridge. I’ve been active in the labor movement since I was seventeen
years old, first in the Bakers, Confectioners, and Tobacco Workers Union—which has a
different name now—in factories around Upstate New York and in Schenectady where I’m
from and Albany. I was in the United Electrical Workers in the mid-eighties, and on the
executive board of the Boston local of the UE, or at that time UE Local 262. And then I did
some union organizing, voluntarily trying to organize a workplace I was in. During that time,
when I came to Boston, I became a socialist around 1984. I went to college in Boston before
that, and I continued to be active in the labor movement, I was a founding member of the
Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers in the late eighties and a union
representative, which was basically a shop steward, of that union for many years, including
the time for which I was active in the Labor Party in MA.
In the early there were a lot of left and socialist independent electoral efforts. My first run in
with left politics was kind of haphazard. I think I was in High School when John Anderson,
who was kind of like a Ross Perot sort of figure but more progressive, ran and attracted a lot
of people on the left to his campaign, including myself although my political ideas were all
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over the place at the time. At the same time, I ran into the Citizen’s Party in Schenectady, an
ex-member of the Socialist Worker’s Party was doing a campaign, he didn’t have a lot of
support, but I was one of his “foot soldiers,” one of his only foot soldiers going door to door
in Schenectady with leaflets and stuff. In many unions there was also talk of a Labor Party.
My union when I was young, the Bakers, Confectioners, and Tobacco Workers Union, went
on strike, and while I don’t remember much about a labor party, among my coworkers there
was always enormous cynicism and hatred of the two parties.
I became a socialist, as I mentioned earlier, as a member of Labor Militant, which is now
known as Socialist Alternative. Now I’m in an organization called the Independent Socialist
Group, which is in political solidarity with the Committee for a Workers International, and
Labor Militant and Socialist Alternative were in the past in political solidarity with the
Committee for a Workers International.

How did you become involved with the Labor Party?
So that was, in a way, more to do with my being involved with a socialist organization, rather
than being active in the Labor Movement because I found out about it first through socialists.
Labor Militant was already talking about the need for a labor party when it officially founded
in this country in 1986. The headline of the first issue of the paper, Labor Militant, was
something to the effect of we need a Labor Party, fight for a labor party, or something like
that. The organizers of Labor Militant, not all of them, but some were from England. I was
not, there was a core of founding members that I was a part of, but the Committee for a
Workers International sent over an organizer and there happened to be two founding
members of Labor Militant from Britain originally but they were living in the U.S. That

Bilsky 127

would be Richard Mellor and Robb Rooke, along with the organizer, John Throne, who
passed away recently. And then a handful of other immigrant and U.S.-born socialists who
founded Labor Militant, and so we were always looking around for labor party, or anything
like that, information or organizing, and it was going on. One of the things we discovered in
helping to form the Labor Party was that in talking to union activists, for me that mostly
meant in MA, but also in national conventions, there was a common thread of “Oh yeah, I
was a part of this group, this small group, or in this union local here or there, and we were
always talking about the need for a labor party.” So the idea of what we would call
independent political action, or forming a labor party or a workers party seemed to be
percolating in the labor movement, below the radar a little bit, but still there before Labor
Party Advocates was started in the early nineties. There was always this interest, and mayb
I’m jumping ahead a little bit, but one of the things that led Tony Mazzocchi, as the prime
mover of the labor party effort, was that members of Labor Militant in the Bay Area, in
Oakland and San Francisco, they encountered members of Labor Militant there as part of an
effort called Bay Area for a Labor Party [Campaign for a Labor Party] or something in the
early eighties, as an actual group of union activists, including John Reimann, Richard Mellor,
people like that. When they became members of Labor Militant, they continued to organize
for that and in the late eighties the organized a conference, I think it was based in Mellor’s
local, he worked for East bay Municipal Utility District as a backhoe driver. He had a
position on the executive board of his local, and he helped organize a conference on a labor
party in his local, and they invited Mazzocchi, I’m not sure how they got in touch with him,
and a hundred and fifty people showed up, at least, and Mazzocchi was very impressed by
those numbers and the quality of the union members involved and so on. And there was
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another conference organized later in New York, and Mazzocchi was there, and these two
conferences, we think—not that Mazzocchi would acknowledge that anywhere in writing or
speeches he did—we think that was a bit of a spark, that plus him working in his own union
to poll workers about a labor party, and the polling results were very good—that’s mentioned
in Dudzic and Isaac’s article, they actually kind of downplay it, it was a big deal—so that
plus the conferences made Mazzocchi think this could be something real.

I’ve read a bit about Labor Party Advocates, but there wasn’t much on it. Would you
be willing to talk more about it?
Oh yeah, because I think it was a big deal for the Labor Party. So Labor Party Advocates was
based on these conferences, based on Mazzocchi’s organizing, based on people he knew, and
based on the general idea in the labor movment here and there about the need for a labor
party, and examples internationally. It all came together in the form of Labor Party
Advocates, and Mazzocchi put out material from his union, he started to work closely with
other like Les Leopold, and that material said “Hey, we did these polls, there’s interests, we
want to start Labor Party Advocates,” and it ended with something saying, “If you’re
interested get in touch with us.” I remember very early on, possibly 1990 or 1991, taking
them up on that offer and myself and a member of Labor Militant that was very enthusiastic
about it just got in touch with their office, back before the wide use of computers, I think we
called or wrote letters. You just joined and you could start a Labor Party Advocates chapter,
and we did that, and there was a good response. So, we pulled a group of people beyond
Labor Militant together into an early Labor Party Advocates chapter. Where the LPA ended
and the Labor Party began, officially it was at the 1996 convention, but I remember it got
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more organized prior to the convention. The LPA chapter in Boston we started grew pretty
well, you know, before the convention I’m sure we were approaching one hundred members
on paper, we’d get forty or whatever to meetings. It was pretty impressive at that time, as far
as the left went in Boston, to have all these people join, because it wasn’t all people from
existing left groups, it was people from unions and the public interested in the labor party,
and that grew bigger after the convention.

When you look at the Dudzic and Isaac article, the LPA, without necessarily saying the
name, was what they mean when they say “well maybe we should not have founded a party.”
So Labor Party Advocates, had this kind of schema. We’re going to sign up a million
members before we form a party, and we’re going to do these campaigns, formulated before
the convention. So LPA had this scheme and it was sort of abstract, we signed up as many
people as we could, but what’s lacking in a lot for the analysis of the Labor Party, including
just not understood in the Dudzic and Isaac article from 2012, is that you can talk all you
want, you can do campaigns on paper and all this other stuff—and we made them more than
on paper in the Boston Area—you can do that stuff, but there’s a limit. There’s a
relationship, a dialectic, between actually organizing a party and starting to run candidates,
and thereby attracting people to the party, and doing organizing outside of just electoral
work. You can’t separate the two, and so now people who were involved in the Labor Party,
they have this thing in their head that it wasn’t really the time yet [to form a party in 1996],
but Mazzocchi was pulled away from that [position] and that’s why there was a founding
convention in 1996, because the sign up a hundred thousand people thing didn’t work.
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There’re so many reasons for that, and I could talk all day, but I’ll just say a few headlines:

People don’t wait forever. Short-termisim, in terms of political thinking is a fact of life.
When you’re organizing you have a window of opportunity, you have a mood, and if you
don’t go through that window or hit the mood right people move on to something else. In this
country that means the “progressive” Democrats that come on the scene promising the world.
If you’re going to form a workers’ party in this country, it’s not like you’ll have forever to do
it. The issue-based campaigns and sign up a million people things didn’t work. To attract
people to the project of building a Labor Party you have to actually do it. You can debate
whether that means simply running local candidates, running in wider races, or a
combination. It was a tension from the start. The debate on running candidates was a
legitimate debate, which was not properly engaged with at key times in the LP and LPA.
They were always pushing back, they being the union leaders that were involved, pushing
back against push up or shut up time, pushing back against running a candidate.

And of course when you’re on the street or talking to a union rank-and-filer or shop steward,
they’re like “Oh Labor Party, how do I vote for you? Where do you run candidates?” They
want something concrete, and you can present them with a campaign, which we did, that’s
concrete and something they can get involved with, but not everyone is an activist. Even
activists aren’t thinking long term a lot of the time. People want an alternative that already
exists, but you can’t have that either, you have to engage people and organize both
electorally and non-electorally, to put it simply, and the Labor Party never got that straight.
They were really trying hard not to piss of the AFL-CIO leaders, some of which were
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nominally supporting the labor party. Dudzic and Isaac mention that John Sweeney said
something nice about the Labor Party in their article, but he also said a lot of not so nice
things about the Labor Party. John Sweeney was a conservative. He was a breath of fresh air
after Lane Kirkland, but when I was involved in meetings in the Boston area of labor
activists supporting Sweeney coming in and the changes he would make, changes like
organizing immigrants were very positive, but Sweeney and the other AFL-CIO leaders kept
their heads in supporting the Democrats, a capitalist party.

One last point on this, but it’s the key theme I feel, why the Labor Party didn’t succeed,
there’s other reasons as well, but trying to appease the Labor bureaucracy at the top of the
AFL-CIO was not going to work. You have to convince the labor leadership, in some cases
you have to fight them and in others you might work with them, but you can’t rely on them.
Every single labor leader at the top who said they supported the labor party effort baled on it
in the run up to the 2000 election, except for Mazzocchi himself and maybe the UE—I’d
have to check on that. So Mazzocchi went around, and the Labor Party was already sort of in
decline after the second convention, but Mazzocchi still held off on running candidates and
held off the radicals—including union activist radicals—and they’re still holding off.
Mazzocchi personally wanted to support Nader running as a Green, who helped the LP in
various ways, and just by talking about wanting to do that as an individual labor leader, the
rest of the AFL-CIO leaders, the ones that were nominally involved in the labor party and
were tolerating it in some ways, they all turned on Mazzocchi and said no, this is too much.
They withdrew their funding and supported Gore and the Democrats. The convention
structures were leaning way to heavily in favor of the union bureaucracy and not enough
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toward lower-level activists, union rank and file, unorganized workers, and community
activists.

How did dual membership between Labor Militant and the Labor Party work?
I was a revolutionary socialist and member of Labor Militant during my entire time in the
Labor Party, and I was open about it. It was a battle to do that, but as far as this dual
membership question is concerned, it didn’t really apply. Throughout my time in Labor
Militant, Socialist Alternative, and the Independent Socialist Group, dual membership
referred to being a member of another small, centralized, left party or organization. Being a
tendency in a mass labor or socialist party is very common and is different than being a
member of multiple small socialist tendencies. Allowing members of Labor Militant to join
the Labor Party wasn’t a tension at all within Labor Militant, we enthusiastically embraced
the Labor Party because it was part of our orientation right from the start.
There was interest in it, as I tried to explain earlier. If you look back at official histories, you
won’t find much about the Labor Party, but there were independent, third-party efforts from
the left throughout the early eighties—like the Citizen’s Party.

What did activity in the Boston Chapter look like?
There was an active chapter from the start in Boston. We paid dues to the Labor Party
nationally and held fundraisers and took donations to support the local chapter financially.
Sometime between the 1996 and 1998 conventions, this guy named Ed Bruno from the UE
became a fulltime organizer—I knew him from when I was in the UE, he was on the
executive board of the Boston local. The Labor Party shared office space with the SEIU at
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Downtown Crossing, I think on Washington Street, and I would go there to work with him
[Ed Bruno] sometimes. In fact, one of my main memories, and this may be out of sequence,
is that we took the Just Healthcare campaign very seriously in Boston.
We got enough signatures to get a non-binding referendum on the ballot in certain districts.
We actually won those, but they were non-binding, so a lot of people didn’t take the results
seriously, but for us it was a victory because it got the issue out. By the way, there have been
a number of times in U.S. history when universal healthcare was a big issue and the
Democrats and Republicans just buried it—like they’re doing now.

Anyway, one of my memories of campaigning for the Labor Party, and as a member of Labor
Militant, was that I had a decent number of people out leafleting and getting signatures for
the Just Healthcare campaign in Teal Square in Somerville—which was more working class
at that time. I don’t remember the chain, it was a well-known chain but it’s out of business
now. Greg Gigg was there from the Teamsters, a lot of young people that I knew through
Labor Militant or left politics, and some other union people. We had a good number of
people, maybe eight of us. You’re legally allowed to get signatures outside of supermarkets,
and other stores like Market Basket—which has a conservative reputation—never hassled us.
But at this one store everything was going great until the Somerville cops pulled up, and they
got out of their car and they didn’t know what was going on. These were rank-and-file cops
and they were sort of questioning us—which wasn’t a good thing to do—but we had a copy
of the law and we handed it to them and they left. But the manager who called them called up
some captain he knew, and the captain rolls up on a motorcycle with another cop car behind
him and we show him the law and discuss very calmly with him. He goes “I don’t give a
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fuck, I don’t give a shit what the law says, if you’re not out of here in five minutes I’m going
to arrest all of you. So here I am, with people who are doing their first political activity, I
didn’t want anyone to get arrested, so we huddled and decided to leave. I remember I got
angry that this arbitrary repression happened, and I went straight down to Boston to the office
with Ed and I sat down with him and said “I think we should challenge this.” He said, and I
kind of understand where he was coming from, “I we challenge it, by the time we organize
and pay for it the referendum window will have passed.” We decided, like a lot of people do
in this country, that it would be too costly to do anything. So we said “fuck it” and the
Somerville police and this captain got away with breaking the law and intimidating a bunch
of people trying to get universal healthcare. An anecdote, but not random. It shows we were
active; we had a real campaign going, and we won these non-binding referendums.

We did a lot of activity. Another anecdote, the Labor Party national wanted us to write opeds and get on the radio to spread the word about the campaign. We had meetings about this
and made plans. We got out op-eds and things in the papers sporadically, but we went to
radio stations and asked to talk about Just Healthcare and I’ll never forget WGBH’s
response. This is public radio mind you. [in a posh, nasal monotone] “We don’t do advocacy
reporting.” Of course, everything that comes out of their mouth is advocating for capitalism
in one way or another. We might have got on some college radio stations, but this was
angering.
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But back to an earlier point, a campaign like that is good, but to get more people involved
and have a real impact you need to also be a serious political party with serious electoral
work. And that was always put on the back burner to the point where it never got cooked.

What did membership look like in the Boston Chapter? Were members organized or
non-union workers? What industries did they represent?
It was a mix of union officials, union activists, and non-union workers. We got to a size
where we started attracting people who were not involved in politics or in unions. We often
met at SEIU local 285, which organized workers at Harvard Pilgrim at the time, and the
person that let us meet there was a guy named Frank Borgias. There was a member of Labor
Militant named Martha Root who was a stop steward for that local. She knew Frank and
talked to him about letting us use the SEIU’s offices to meet, and they had a large room that
could hold about sixty people and the building itself was very accessible, right near the
Parkway T and the Downtown Crossing stop. We would literally have people walk in off the
street for some of the public meetings that we had. We had at least monthly meetings of the
membership, and then executive board meetings and so on. I remember a couple meetings in
the winter where we just had homeless people walk into the back of the room to be warm and
we welcomed them. I’m not saying that to be charitable, we just let people walk in and they
could participate in meetings like anyone else. So, we had a viable community chapter of the
Labor Party. Later we had a Somerville chapter that met in the Public Library and various
churches and union halls.
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And the Boston Chapter gaining members became a pole of attraction for union officials who
had left politics, some of whom kept those politics hidden. We held open elections to
determine who was on the chapter’s executive board, and Martha and myself—who were
openly revolutionary socialists and shop stewards—were elected. Martha may have held
some official position in her union, but despite helping to organize my union local at
Harvard, the more conservative leadership of my local kept me out of an official position
because of my politics. I want this on the record that Chris Rondeau of the Harvard Union of
Clerical and Technical workers told me we couldn’t have South African anti-Apartheid union
activist Nimrod Sejake come and speak to our local because “that would be too radical.” At
the same time, many other unions allowed me to organize a speaking tour for Nimrod,
including the CWA and UE. I won’t get into it, but at one of those meetings we ran into
trouble with a little fascist group based out of Southie. I was doing three things at once,
helping to organize the Labor Party, helping to organize Labor Militant, and running the
union drive at Harvard.
So anyway, I was a shop steward, Martha was a shop steward and maybe on the eboard, but
other people like Theresa El-Amin, Jeff Crosby, and Frank Borgias on the executive board of
the LP had full time union positions. They eventually decided, after we had all worked very
well together to build the chapter, that when there was another election where Martha and I
won a second term they didn’t like that. Theresa pulled me into her office—and this was
weird because before this she asked me to become a leader of Black Workers for Justice,
even though I’m not Black. They had a multiracial structure, mostly lead by Black workers
and activists. There was a Black Activist named Alan Booth from the IUE local that was
involved. He and I went to a convention in North Carolina for Black Workers for Justice with
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Theresa.—and she explicitly said that because we were openly socialists “you and Martha
remaining on the executive board would be too much for the leadership.” Frank, Jeff, and
Theresa went after me and Martha, and this was after we had had the chapter going for a
while, and we said no, we feel strongly about being open about being socialists. They told us
to resign, and we said no, we were elected, and we won’t resign, but we’ll have another
election. So, we had another election, and we won, and they hated that so much.

After that, Crosby started losing interest, but we asked him to have a meeting about the Labor
Party in his local and he agreed. He turned that into a meeting to immediately vote to join the
Labor Party, and he didn’t organize for it. The right wing of his local, the motorcycle riding
right wing workers at the GE Plant, went and packed the meeting. Crosby, in his own local as
president lost the vote and he didn’t really care that much I don’t think. He moved on to
supporting Democrats through the North Shore Labor Council after that.

This is illustrative of a bigger problem in the Labor Party; besides it never running a serious
electoral campaign at any level. There was always this tension between on paper—and I do
believe Mazzocchi did organizing in his own union, and we certainly did in my local of
AFSCME 3650 and SEIU 285—unions endorsing the party and the membership not actually
mobilizing for it. In my local, the unelected leadership including Chris Rondeau and his pork
choppers (business unionists making big salaries in leadership positions) never backed the
Labor Party, but I convinced some rank-and-file activists to join.
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But this is the point: Even ostensibly pro-Labor Party union officials, they mostly failed to
organize their members to support the Labor Party. You can pass a resolution in your
executive board meeting, you can support a campaign on paper, but most union officials—
and this is a problem with Dudzic and Isaac’s article, they’re not honest about organizing and
courting labor leaders who were doing a lot wrong at the time, like they would say these
labor leaders represent a million workers or ten thousand workers, they’d give these figures
at conventions and in articles, the problem was that yeah, they say they represent that many
workers, but how many were active in their union local? How many even heard about the
Labor Party? Mazzocchi, I think, dipped into his union on this in a serious way, but many
labor leaders didn’t. When we had the chapter going, LPA then later the official Labor Party
chapter, in Boston and Somerville, we would have an official list from the national—which
we had to fight to get to a certain extent but we got it--of unions leaders to approach and try
to get a meeting at their local. The best we could ever do was a meeting with officers, maybe
a shop steward or two, but not even that in many cases. In other words there was severe
gatekeeping going on. I remember there was an OCAW local in Waltham, and we met with
one person from that local where we said “we want to meet with your members.” We would
put forward different formulas for both official and unofficial meetings, but 99% of the time,
including at that OCAW local, they would either say “no, we can’t do that,” or they would
just string us along until it never happened. I can think of Paul Tracy of AFGE, on paper
AFGE supported the Labor Party. Did we ever get a meeting with anyone but Paul Tracy
from AFGE? No. And he was a really nice guy and everything, but we never got a meeting.
There was Dave Slaney, one of those underground Maoist-New Left types, an officer of a
Steel Workers local. Could we ever get a meeting with his local? I still remember being on
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the phone with this guy, who I’d seen on the Left many times before and after this, nope.
Could never get his meeting with his local. These were people who claimed to have
progressive politics and locals, but there was severe gate keeping. Just horrible.

I remember seeing Theresa El Amin, who was very active, standing there in the back of the
room. And she didn’t have a vote—even if I disagreed with her on stuff—like the union,
frankly, bureaucrats populating those long tables at the front.

These union leaders represent x thousand workers, and I agree with that sentiment to some
extent, but you have to make it real… and they never made it real. There were some
exceptions. The UE did some, I remember being allowed to speak at a UE convention,
despite being of the executive board for a number of years, about the Labor Party.

There was a bunker mentality with the unions, separating them from the community. It boils
down to the old argument about business unionism or social unionism, but even those
claiming to be social unionists would gatekeep us. They wouldn’t so much as let union
activists, let alone community activists, near their locals to talk to their members. That’s why
the Labor Party failed, because if you give all that power, in terms of voting, just to union
bureaucrats, and you don’t find a way to get past the gate keepers and convince them
politically to support things you, then it won’t translate to real party.

All the big labor leaders that Mazzocchi bragged about getting involved, they had one foot in
the Democratic Party the whole time and one tentative toe dipped into the Labor Party. So
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they never really, with the exceptions of the UE, the OCAW, and a few others, had real rankand-file support and that’s why it failed. They gave money, they gave resources, they gave
some of their activists out to things, but they wouldn’t organize their rank-and-file.

Notes from Interview on March 29th, 2021
Labor Party members were generally older, organized in the Sixties and Seventies.
The Labor Party Press was a traditional newspaper with a blue masthead. Booth had been
interviewed for it at some point.

I asked a question about the mood at the various LP Conventions.
Booth attended two conventions and a “Train the Trainers” event in New Jersey. The Train
the Trainers curriculum was based on a Paulo Fieri’s “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” and was
run by the OCAW.
At the 1998 convention, Michael Moore showed a pilot then gave a long speech. By this
point he had a few movies under his belt and had published a book. Before joining the LP, he
spoke at an event at Boston University, where he stopped by Socialist Alternative’s table
about the Labor Party outside afterward and talked with Jeff for a bit. He later contacted LP
members in New York City.
Speech at BU was “stupid,” Moore advocated for students to watch FRIENDS to identify
with working class culture. Speech at the ’98 convention had similar themes. The pilot he
showed in ’98 wasn’t very funny. It starred Chris Elliot and lasted over 20 minutes.
Ralph Nader was at the Second Labor Party Convention.
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Discussion moves to the second convention’s debate on running candidates. Most of the
points made were identical to points made in the first interview and have been omitted, as the
direct quotes are better. Booth mentions Mazzocchi’s quote about organizing over the
backyard fence, and says there is some truth to it, that unions once had roots in communities.
The discussion turns back to the general mood at the conventions.
LP was larger by ’98, and as it gained steam, the pressure to run candidates was more acute
due to the convention’s timing.
“The conventions were big, with long tables at the front for the unions with the most power,
the smaller union locals in the middle, and the activists pushed to the back.”
Discussion moves on to NAFTA and some economic points.
Clinton was an educational process for labor leaders due to NAFTA. It opened a degree of
separation between organized labor and the Democrats.
NAFTA led to a sharp decline for unions and living standards, but it was also a “slow bleed.”
The more progressive unions and activists joined the Labor Party.
Back to Convention Moods
The conventions had different types of energy, ’96 had a march to support newspaper
workers and was exciting because it was new. ’98 was exciting because it was bigger, more
serious.
Back to Economics
There was a growing bubble from 1998-1999 which covered for Clinton’s failures. Low
unemployment and the growth of tech jobs made it look like poverty was going down in the
aftermath of Clinton and Congress slashing welfare and implementing the 1994 crime bill,
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and deindustrialization due to NAFTA. 1999-2000 saw this bubble pop, but 9/11 covered up
the recession.
Decline of the Labor Party
The 2000 election buried the Party.
Mazzocchi was clearly the main leader, it would have been better to have collective
leadership when he died.
The election campaign run by the Labor Party in 2010 was more of a “curiosity” than
anything else. Booth saw it in the news, but never saw the results.
Booth says to look into the Pittston Coal Strike and the Jackie Stump campaign as an
example of an independent labor electoral campaign.

Notes from Interview on April 25th, 2021
I asked about Left Factionalism in the LP.
Golden Gate Chapter problems mentioned by Leopold may refer to Socialist Organizer.

OCAW locals gatekept in MA when LP tried to talk to the locals.
Better luck with speaking to UE.
Some Maoists in the LP were also union leaders, but were paranoid about showing off their
left politics.
Sean Sweeney and Gloria Mattera led a faction within Socialist Alternative advocating for
the SA to become a tendency within the Labor Party, moving away from being an
independent organization and possibly distancing itself from the CWI. Most of the New York
Metro Chapter backed this faction.
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Tensions often came to a head at SA’s National Committee meetings between Jeff and Sean,
could get ugly at times. Jeff and Phillip Locker opposed the faction, on the grounds that SA’s
student work and engagement with the anti-globalization movement—which the LP failed to
capitalize on—was becoming more fruitful than work within the LP.
Sweeney’s faction lost steam after the NY Metro Chapter’s expulsion. Sweeney and Mattera
left Socialist Alternative, Mattera remained active in independent politics through the Green
party.
Discussed 9/11 in some detail. A transcribed quote is below.
“You know Boston, it’s a liberal area (we can get into what that means), with some left
presence. Imagine every house suddenly having an American flag in front of it. They would
have these big standouts in towns where everyone would light candles on their porch. I was
with Philip Locker at Breuger’s Bagel Place, and the television was on and—boom! 9/11 hit
and we realized ‘Oh shit… we won’t be able to do anything after this.’ Every time we saw a
house without a flag, we’d stare at it, we’d only see maybe one or two in any given
neighborhood. At the time I remember talking to a coworker in the Harvard library about
Marxism, and another coworker, a professional not in the union, came along and told us
‘Now that’s quite enough of that.’ Nothing was going on for the left in the immediate
aftermath, not until the anti-Iraq War moment sometime later. 2000 election knocked out the
Labor Party, 9/11 buried it.”
I forget the context of this next quote.
“John Sweeney was an old school union bureaucrat, from McCarthyist times.”
Booth’s Personal Anecdote about the Tech Bubble
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“5 People I was good friends with lost jobs, and 25 or thirty acquaintances I knew through
them did as well.”
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Appendix II: A Few Responses to Questions About the LP from Gary Olson
Compiled from an email exchange on February 8th and February 17th, 2021. Olson’s
responses have been aligned with the questions sent to him for ease of reference.
What was your experience with labor and left-wing organizing prior to joining the
Labor Party?
I was active in the civil rights and anti-war movement of 1960s, until receiving my Ph.D. In
1974. And in grad school I was active in organizing a chapter of the Students for Democratic
Society (SDS) which resulted in an arrest and a lengthy FBI file. From then on, the bulk of
my time was spent on teaching international politics and U.S. foreign policy at the college
level and writing books, articles and op-eds, always with a radical focus.
Were you involved with the Labor Party’s predecessor Labor Party Advocates? If so,
what role did you play in that organization and the founding of the Labor Party in
1996?
I was member of Labor Party Advocates and an at-large delegate to the LP’s funding
convention in Cleveland as a member of the National Writers Union.
You were chair of the Lehigh Valley chapter of the Labor Party in Pennsylvania, one of
the largest LP chapters in the country. What did membership in this chapter look like?
Were members primarily workers organized by unions or unorganized workers and
community members? What industries did members of your chapter tend to work in?
We named ourselves the “Brennan Chapter of the Labor Party” in the Lehigh Valley, PA.
The late John Brennan had been a local union activist, president of the Pennsylvania Labor
History Society and a registered socialist. At its peak, we had 150 members with about 30
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attending our monthly meetings which were held at Moravian College in Bethlehem. The
composition was largely students, professors, unorganized workers, and retirees but also
some 20 UE, Teamster, and USW members.
What sort of activity did your chapter engage in? Did you organize public meetings,
rallies, or protests? Were you involved in any strikes as part of the Labor Party?
Our chapter was active on local picket lines including a large daily presence at the local UPS
distribution center in Bethlehem during their national strike. We marched with and raised our
LP banner at annual Gay Pride rallies in Allentown, organized a large protest against NIKE
in Bethlehem, another on the need for national health with speakers from Physicians for
Social Responsibility and frequent pop-up protests regarding worker’s rights a localmalls.
We published opinion pieces in the region’s local newspaper, The Morning Call, that
described our program and aspirations. We viewed labor films and had frequent guest
speakers at our chapter meetings including, for example, Tony Mazzochi and officers from
the NYC LP chapter.
How did your chapter engage with unions in your area?
Thanks to my friendship over the years with local members of the Steelworkers and
Teamsters, we were invited to make presentations to their local meetings. At one point, I was
welcomed to join the monthly meetings of the Lehigh Valley Labor Council, the umbrella
group for all the locals that met at the USW’s Van Bittner Hall in Bethlehem. These
combined a social function with political discussions and were fruitful for a time. Eventually,
due to pressure from the local Democratic Party hierarchy —who were closely tied with the
Labor Council and were uncomfortable with my presence — I was gently “disinvited” from
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further attendance at these gatherings. This intransigent hostility from the Democratic Party
presaged one of the most serious challenges faced by both the local and national LP.
Did international events in the 1980s and 90s, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or
the rise of the Workers’ Party in Brazil, have an effect the Labor Party’s development?
To what degree did the LP consider international politics in its work?
I’m unaware of international events having a major effect on the LP unless you count redbaiting.
How many Labor Party national conventions did you attend? What were your thoughts
on each of them? Did you notice any changes in tone or the general mood of each
convention?
I attended all the LP national meetings and took part in writing a few position papers. I must
say that, for me, nothing compared to my emotional reaction to the Founding Convention in
Cleveland in 1996. As the vote passed, marking the transition LPA to The Labor Party, I
looked across the hall at several hundred diverse faces and felt that I’d been waiting for this
moment my entire life. Upon returning home, a few of us set to work organizing a local
chapter.

While the next three bolded “questions” were originally three separate “questions” in the
email originally sent, Olson responded to all of them together in his reply. Rather than parse
out the response to address each question separately, the original answer has been left
intact.
I’ve read about tensions rising within the labor party around the 2000 election,
particularly about whether or not to run candidates or to endorse Ralph Nader. In his
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biography of Tony Mazzocchi, Les Leopold mentions Mazzocchi’s appearance at a
Green Party convention around this time as a key moment in discrediting the LP in the
eyes of AFL-CIO leadership. What did you think of the Labor Party’s approach to
elections? How did the debate about running or endorsing candidates play out in your
chapter?
When did your involvement in the Labor Party end? What did you see as the main
factors contributing to its decline? Could things have been done differently to ensure its
survival, or did conditions guarantee its collapse?
The LP ran candidates in South Caroline a few years after Tony Mazzochi’s death in
2002. What did you think of the post-Mazzocchi Labor Party?
It’s my strong sense that the refusal of the AFL-CIO hierarchy in Washington, DC to
embrace the LP was the fatal blow to its demise. We could not move ahead without their vast
organization and financial resources. And it was their masochistic relationship with the
Democratic Party that accounted for their position and any talk of running LP candidates for
office was anathema to them. For sure, Tony’s death in 2002 was also a serious blow as was
the abysmally low level of class consciousness in this country. Further, I’m not sure how
many LP members knew how many legal obstacles the corporate duopoly had set up against
third parties gaining any traction. Finally, although it wasn’t an issue in our chapter, I was
aware that tension between more traditional LP members and more militant “entry-ists” from
various left sectarian groups was an issue in some chapters. I expect you have learned or will
learn about this in your research.
At the time when our chapter when on “hiatus” in 2005, we had not taken a position on
running candidates but union members in our group took their cue from higher-ups and were
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strenuously opposed to it. Had we attempted to do so, even with the needed LP national
approval, I can well imagine it would have split the group and in any event, not been
productive.
Do you think the experience of the Labor Party has any relevance today? What can
class conscious workers today learn from the history of the Labor Party?
Lessons? For me, creating a mass movement must take precedence over a new party or at
least they must occur simultaneously. I’m encouraged by the interest now in evidence about
the first Rainbow Coalition in Chicago in the late 1960s. The Black Panthers, Young Lords
(Puerto Rican) and the Young Patriots (poor white migrants from Appalachia) were able to
put aside their differences in favor of their interests as a class. Alas, owing to COINTELPRO
this was not to be but there’s no objective reason it can’t be attempted again on a larger scale.
It was this type of vision that animated my original attraction to the Labor Party.

